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The Barbara and Richard M. Rosenberg Institute for East Asian Studies at Suffolk University

The Barbara and Richard M. Rosenberg Institute
for East Asian Studies at Suffolk University
Established in 2007, the Rosenberg Institute serves as the lead platform in the field of Asian Studies at Suffolk. It presents a regular series
of lectures on topics of current and academic interest about Asia to the
faculty and students of Suffolk. Its programs, which are free and open
to the public, have been attended by scholars and students from many
universities and colleges in the Boston and New England area, along
with professionals and members of the interested public. In this sense,
the Institute’s activities are presented as a public service available for all
interested parties.
The Institute cooperates with the Asian Studies Program at Suffolk
which benefits many of our students, even beyond those who select to
major or minor in Asian Studies. The Institute has lent its endorsement to a number of student-related activities such as the annual Asian
New Year’s Party, the screening of films from Asia, and activities of the
student clubs which include the Asian-American Student’s Association,
the Indian Student’s Club, the Vietnamese Student’s Club, etc.
As a further way of being part of our community, the Institute has
active involvement with community-based groups such as the Asian
Taskforce Against Domestic Violence, the Chinese Historical Society of New England, the Boston Chinatown Neighborhood Center,
and the educational non-profit Primary Source. These organizations
are endorsed cited by Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, Boston
Mayor Thomas Menino, and other civic leaders.
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Introduction From the Rosenberg Institute Director

Introduction From the Rosenberg
Institute Director
Public Medicine in Wartime China is the first in our series of Occasional Papers issued by the Rosenberg Institute for East Asian Studies
at Suffolk University. When the Institute was established in 2007, our
benefactors Barbara and Richard M. Rosenberg agreed that the Institute would prepare “academic papers and publications” to be offered
“as intellectual activities and research of the Rosenberg Institute…”
Their generosity allows us to offer this study to the academic and
professional public. This Occasional Paper is based on a longer study
of the subject by Dr. Watt, and also follows a presentation he made at
Suffolk in April 2010, co-sponsored with the Taiwan Economic and
Cultural Office in Boston. The event was widely reported in several
Chinese language newspapers. Dr. Watt’s full-length study is now
being prepared for publication.
The Rosenberg Institute is pleased to publish this thoughtful
paper. It will be of interest to those concerned with understanding
China’s wartime experience in the 1930s and 1940s, the efforts to
set up public health and medical services throughout China in the
twentieth century, and those who continue to encourage non-profit
institutions in the United States to cooperate with professionals and
leaders in China on projects that are in the public interest. Dr. Watt
is a widely-respected scholar whose many contributions to better
American-Chinese understanding over the past forty years have been
acknowledged on many occasions.
Through this publication he joins the recently formed Rosenberg
Institute in carrying forward the dialogue of understanding between
the Chinese and American people that is so crucial and rewarding for
all of us.
Ronald Suleski, PhD
Director
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Preface: Out of Chaos

Preface: Out of Chaos
Caroline Reeves
The historiography of Republican China (1912-1949) has traditionally described an interregnum of chaos between the fall of the
Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) and the post-1949 re-imposition of order
in Communist and Nationalist China. But a more nuanced picture of
this era is beginning to emerge, and John Watt’s work on the development of a biomedical infrastructure for China from 1931-1945 contributes importantly to this corrective. Watt is well known to historians of
China for his expertise on one of the most pivotal underpinnings of the
Qing Dynasty’s imperial stability: the District Magistrate and his role in
effecting the power of the Qing state at the local level. Ironically, Watt
now turns his attention to this later era of disarray and the innovation
inherent in chaos. Once again, he paints a detailed, convincing picture
of individuals and their contributions in creating the structures of everyday life, in this instance under dauntingly adversarial conditions.
During the early part of the twentieth century, China was indeed
in a period of flux. Caught in the shifting sands of global power relations, the Qing Dynasty endured repeated incursions into its cultural,
economic and political sovereignty. China’s neighbor, the industrially
emergent Meiji Japan, was one of the states most interested in China’s
natural and territorial wealth. In the first Sino-Japanese War of 18941895, Japan began its creep into China, focusing on the economic
exploitation of China’s rich Northeast. As Japan’s ambitions for China
began turning to Western-style colonial imperialism, however, its
expansionist plans intensified. Over the next four decades, Japan grew
progressively bold in the region. Flexing its newly modernized military
muscle, in 1904 the Japanese challenged the Russian army over Russia’s
influence in the Far East, audaciously confronting and defeating a
“European” power for the first time and winning a victory that stunned
the world. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was actually fought
primarily on Chinese soil, and led to additional loss of Chinese territory and Chinese lives.
9
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Soon, Japan’s World War I takeover of German territory in Shandong further expanded Japan’s reach within China. Although the
“Shandong Question” was ultimately resolved in favor of the Chinese,
Japan’s intent to enter China politically and militarily was increasingly
clear, as was the inevitable cost to the Chinese people. Domestic unrest,
revolution (1911) and civil war accompanied Japanese and Western
military actions in China. The results were bloody for the Chinese.
In 1931, Japanese aspirations for China began to come to fruition
Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. Although the second Sino-Japanese War did not formally begin until 1937, the escalation of violence
within China throughout the 1930s exacerbated problems already
endemic to the Republican era: poverty, increased mortality, political
instability, and social conflict. For the majority of the Chinese people,
war, violence, and dislocation were the constant realities of this era.
Despite this apparent chaos, however, the human impetus to order
did not come to a halt. From within the maelstrom came vibrant
improvisation: social actors working towards a better, stronger China—
regardless of how unstable China had become. China’s scholarly elite
had long felt a responsibility to better their polity, whether through
political remonstrance or personal action. Now this elite was joined by
sectors of society newly emboldened by the implosion of Confucian
social orthodoxy and the myriad opportunities often accompanying
social turmoil: China’s women, youth, and those without a Classical
education. These men and women did not wait for peace and stability to try to fix China’s many problems. Instead, they dealt with the
situations at hand in practical, effective ways, building for the future in
conditions that would seem to stymie any practicable action at all.
It is this story that John Watt tells in this monograph: the story
of a dedicated and exceptional cadre of Chinese and their creation of
a fledgling system of public medicine and medical education. Born
under exceedingly difficult conditions, this system would go on to
provide the basis for the post-war take-off of medical improvements
in both the PRC and Taiwan. Doctors, nurses, medical students and
faculty, committed administrators as well as stretcher bearers and other
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hospital workers managed to keep biomedical clinical education and
laboratory work alive, even as the Japanese overran the areas in which
they were based. Working with systems new to China—biomedical
technologies, pedagogical practices, and public health methods, these
actors physically and intellectually laid the groundwork for a new
biomedical infrastructure which would provide pathways for further
development once China finally came to peace.
Biomedicine provided an ideal field for innovation in early-twentieth-century China. Although China had been gradually augmenting its storehouse of modern science, medicine, and technology since
the sixteenth century, the promises and perquisites of Science—writ
large—in the post-1900 period seemed to expand exponentially,
necessitating an urgent drive towards its acquisition. Social Darwinist
ideas, promulgated by Herbert Spencer gained traction among the
Chinese intelligentsia as the empire gave way to an increasingly fractious
warlord era. These doctrines made threats of racial and national annihilation explicit, and harnessing science to combat this ominous future
became critical to national survival.
The Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 made this threat to the
Chinese race very real indeed. The war’s dislocation of tens of thousands of civilians put a large proportion of the population at immediate
risk of disease, starvation, air raids, banditry, and rape. Biomedicine,
particularly in contradistinction to “traditional Chinese medicine,”
offered a concrete path to bettering the Chinese body politic, literally
as well as figuratively. In particular, the field of public health, through
its emphasis on hygiene and preventive care, appeared to offer a new
way to counteract the deadly epidemics swept in by modern intercourse
that neither the gods of disease nor the individual medical practitioner
could counteract.
As the Japanese invasion made the need to attend to China’s wounded unequivocal, biomedicine developed increasingly rapidly in China.
The process of the global socialization of China’s intelligentsia—the
education of China’s future leaders in international settings—was
already well underway, and contributed significantly to these develop-
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ments. Men and women who had studied abroad or studied in Japanese or Western institutions in Asia acquired expertise that they then
brought home to their nation. China’s biomedical pioneers returned
to their localities with passionate ideals and ideas about how to use
their new science in the service of the state. With their cutting edge
knowledge, these new-style public servants were able to address the
two paramount social imperatives of their era, imperatives that to them
were inextricably linked: scientific modernization and national salvation. Performing for their wounded compatriots lying in front of them
as well as for an international community for whom they wanted to
demonstrate their ability to conduct a “civilized” war, they saw their
provision of biomedical services as a matter of life and death—both to
their patients’ and to China’s survival.
This account is one of incremental improvements, advances that were
often wiped out with one bomb or battle. The hard work behind the
construction of a teaching hospital or barely adequate student dormitory
rooms was too often destroyed in a few moments by invading armies or
aerial bombardment, and sometimes even by retreating Chinese armies.
But the resilience and resourcefulness of China’s medical workers, determined to bring modernity in the form of biomedical care and training
to China even in the midst of brutal combat, ultimately outlasted the
depredations of war. Spurred on by a nascent patriotism, the students
and their teachers continued to re-build, to care for patients, and to
move their public health projects forward.
Watt charts how the benefits of field experience and the will to
learn survived the chaos and reemerged at the end of the war, laying
the basis for a new public health infrastructure rooted firmly in a
continued commitment to modern biomedical education. Watt gives
us careful portraits of the individual men and women—not generals
or politicians or warlords or landlords, but simply people who cared
about other people—who worked throughout this period of chaos
to try to create a healthier environment for the moment and for
the future. To be sure, Western medical agencies, such as the China
Medical Board, the American Bureau for Medical Advancement in
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China, the American Red Cross, the British Red Cross, a missionarysponsored International Red Cross, and the Friends Ambulance Unit
contributed funds, supplies and personnel to the work of Chinese
medical agencies; and foreign medical personnel, including physicians
from Republican Spain, Indian volunteers, and stand-out personalities
such as Dr. Norman Bethune, pitched in at the battlefront alongside
Chinese colleagues. Idealism and determination triumphed repeatedly over adversity and the achievements of Chinese medical reformers
ultimately endured long after the conclusion of the war with Japan.
With this publication, John Watt’s work adds greatly to our understanding of late Republican China, the Second Sino-Japanese War,
and the development of biomedical systems in Asia during the early
twentieth century.
Caroline Reeves, PhD
Emmanuel College
Boston, MA
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Introduction: The Context of Change in Republican China

Introduction: The Context of
Change in Republican China
Modern health care took shape in China during one of the most
chaotic eras in that country’s long history. It would have been hard
enough to develop effective modern health services in a country as
susceptible to poverty and epidemic disease as was early twentiethcentury China. But the innovators of that era had to deal not only
with the institutional breakdowns that occurred during the Warlord
Era (1911-1928), but also with the far greater human and systemic
problems caused by civil war and by Japan’s invasion and occupation of mainland China from 1931 to 1945. One has only to read
accounts of Nationalist China’s military hospitals at the height of
the Japanese onslaught in 1937 and 1938, or the mass migrations
caused by war, flood, and famine, to appreciate the horrible conditions confronting China’s wartime health workers and its sick and
wounded patients.1
Yet it is at this critical time that the modern health services in
China struggled to stand on their own feet. Under conditions of exceptional deprivation, medical and nursing schools took control of their
collective missions and carried on teaching and learning. Public health
services came to large areas of western China for the first time. Red
Cross and auxiliary medical services produced significant numbers of
health workers trained in basic triage, sanitation, and techniques for
controlling epidemic diseases. China’s Red Armies, beginning from
1927, developed health services that emphasized preventive health and
hygiene, catered to civilians and enemy prisoners as well as the military, and drew in practitioners of Chinese medicine and pharmacy in
the interest of saving lives. During this turbulent era, many of China’s
modern medical leaders weaned themselves from dependence on
foreign patronage and direction, substituting the preventive and more
cost-effective strategies of State Medicine for the earlier hospital- and
mission-based services of missionary medicine. All these innovations
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were in place before 1949, providing the groundwork for the development of Communist China’s health services.
A notable aspect of this story was the attention given to biomedical,
nursing, and more generally health service education. The Nationalist government set up a Commission on Medical Education (CME),
headed initially by medical reformers, that took as its goal the expansion of biomedical education throughout China through the formation of national medical colleges. Before the full-scale Japanese invasion in 1937 this initiative made considerable progress (as detailed
below). The government’s National Health Administration (NHA) set
up the Public Health Personnel Training Institute to train physicians
and other health specialists for the task of promoting State Medicine
in rural areas. As the NHA had a minuscule budget, the Rockefeller
Foundation stepped in to help get this program started.
After the Japanese armies moved into North and Central China,
Dr. Lin Kesheng (Robert K. S. Lim, chair of the Department of
Physiology at the Peking Union Medical College [PUMC]) took on
the leadership of the Red Cross Medical Relief Commission (later
Corps). He and his staff organized increasing numbers of medical teams that visited armies in combat, providing relief, patient
care, and, where possible, ad hoc training. In 1938 Dr. Lin’s Red
Cross Medical Relief Corps began providing organized field service
training in hygiene and sanitation for health workers in China’s
armies and public health agencies. This training program continued
through 1945.
Meanwhile the Chinese Red Army groups found out as early as
1927 that their shortage of health workers and the vulnerability of
their military and base area civilian populations to injury and disease
could best be mitigated through the introduction of training programs.
These began in the late 1920s, and it was not long thereafter before
the leadership in the southern Jiangxi base areas set up a health training school. That school continued operating throughout the Long
March era (1934-1936) and through the War of Resistance against
Japan (1937-1945). The political and military leadership also promot-
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ed health campaigns throughout most of its base area civilian populations. Political agents encouraged base area inhabitants to assist by
providing rooms as hospital wards, sending food supplies to hospitalized patients, and encouraging their young people to serve as nursing
aides and stretcher bearers.
An important part of the leadership for all this training came from
existing medical colleges and, to a certain extent, from representatives
of the world of Chinese medicine. A significant number of graduates
from the PUMC (including its nursing program) signed up with Dr.
Lin and the Chinese Red Cross, as did graduates from other medical colleges, such as Tongji and St. John’s (in Shanghai), Xiangya (in
Changsha, and during the war in Guiyang and Chongqing), and Jilu
(in Jinan, Shandong, and during the war in Chengdu). Dr. Lin’s strong
connections with Singapore (where he was born) brought in many
young volunteers from overseas Chinese communities in Southeast
Asia who were inspired by his loyalty to his ancestral country. Until the
war spread into Southeast Asia, these overseas communities also sent
money to support the work of the Red Cross Medical Relief Corps.
A number of young people who committed themselves to serving
in Red Army health services came from the so-called second-tier medical colleges set up along Japanese educational lines or from Christian
missionary hospitals, especially those that had provided services to sick
and wounded Red Army soldiers. The Red Armies also benefited from
the services of refugee Jewish physicians and other foreign medical
friends, of whom the best known is the Canadian surgeon Dr. Norman
Bethune, who died of septicemia while serving the Eighth Route Army.
But their principal source of support came from their own political and
military leadership, including (but not limited to) such leaders as Peng
Pai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, He Long, and Nie Rongzhen. Each went
on to be recognized as a major leader within the Chinese Communist
Party. The American journalist Agnes Smedley served as a dedicated
and unflagging foreign commentator on, and participant observer and
fundraiser for, the work of the Red Army and Red Cross health care
units. Her wartime reflections on this work are still very readable.2
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All this attention to training should not come as a surprise in a
culture that had for centuries been so committed to education for
public service. What we see in this period, however, is a huge and
not yet fully documented or understood expansion of the concept
and substance of public service in China and an equally large expansion in the numbers and range of individuals admitted to the world
of training for work in the public arena. For many young educated
people, public service now included the patriotic duty to come to the
rescue of a country and people attacked by a powerful and determined
foreign enemy. It required education and training in fields of activity
not previously seen by educated individuals as relevant to the maintenance of public order. For others it constituted a call to end an era of
subservience to foreign power generally and to acquire whatever skills
and disciplines it took to build a modern society and a nation that
could defend itself. Another related public order goal that acquired
revolutionary momentum during this period consisted in overthrowing an oppressive social order, which had become unusually severe in
its impact on farming communities as a result of the downfall of the
traditional empire and the outbreak of an unrestrained, multilayered,
and violently oppressive warlordism.
Given such a broad scope and controversial edge to the new
concepts of public service, it is not surprising to find these concepts
and their adherents mobilizing large numbers of people, or that the
mobilizers turned to individuals almost all of whom had hitherto
either rejected such concepts, or felt entirely unqualified to embrace
them, or had no awareness even of their existence. For example,
individuals educated in Confucian values had traditionally rejected
enrollment in military or paramilitary organizations such as the Red
Cross Medical Relief Corps. Within the medical world, enrollment
in surgical service was traditionally not part of Chinese medical practice and too closely associated with Western missionary practice to
attract individuals brought up in Confucian or Daoist settings. Men
who did enroll in military medical services were generally individuals
considered too weak to function in combat service; basic knowledge
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of medicine or even of rudimentary health care was not a requirement
for service as army medical aides. As for the teenage country boys
and girls who came to serve the Red Armies as stretcher bearers and
nursing helpers or as army messengers and guides, such an initiation
could succeed only in a society that was deliberately searching for
new directions.
It would be easy to think of the old order in China as unraveling
fairly rapidly once the examination system ended, the Qing empire
collapsed, and the warlords took over. But in fact old ideas did not
disappear so quickly. Even as late as 1945, Nationalist military leaders
had a hard time seeing any value in military medical training, while
many physicians in private practice were still reluctant to commit
themselves to military service and national defense. For others, medical practice, particularly when dealing with bodily fluids, was seen as
dirty work unfit for people with educational aspirations. Practitioners
of biomedicine were regarded as following a foreign way that was as
intrusive in its dealings with human bodies as Westerners were in
their dealings with China. Where Chinese medicine doctors practiced
“internal” medicine and intervened in bodies with needles interacting discreetly at specific points in long-established energy channels,
those trained in Western medical and surgical arts (many of them
trained abroad) encroached from the outside with scalpels and saws or
used drugs outside the Chinese pharmacopeia. The cultural tensions
between these two ways of medical treatment (one primarily internal
and belonging to China, the other seen by most Chinese people as
primarily external and belonging to the West) significantly affected
Nationalist politics and military practice. More broadly, they prevented Chinese health care workers trained in biomedicine from understanding the continued relevance of Chinese medicine to Chinese
health. As a result, the great majority of individuals apprenticed in
Chinese medicine and pharmacology remained outside and essentially
banned from the world of public service.
The more obvious and better known tensions are those that existed between individuals and parties who supported Nationalist poli-

19

Public Medicine in Wartime China: The Rosenberg Institute for East Asian Studies:

tics and those who supported and served the Chinese Communist
party and the Red Armies. The civil war that broke out between these
two forces in 1927 was as brutal and deadly as the war between the
Chinese and Japanese armed forces. Nationalist forces gave no quarter
to captured Red Army personnel, even if medical or injured and sick.
In one incident after another, such people were formally executed or
simply slaughtered. Communist forces, in turn, gave little if any quarter to landlords and their hated militias. Dr. Lin and his Red Cross
allies got into serious trouble for supporting both sides in this civil war
in the effort to maximize opposition to the invading Japanese armies.
In this context, it proved very hard to reconcile conflicting definitions
of public service in relation to the overall protection of human life.
Despite these chasms in the public domain, the 1930s provided an
era of international innovation in public health and medical education, in which China played an important role. Representatives of
the League of Nations Health Section and the Rockefeller Foundation took great interest in initiatives taking place in China and helped
significantly to support them. In certain respects, China became a
major field for the development of public health ideas, particularly the
concept of State Medicine conceived in Eastern Europe in the wake
of World War I. Under Dr. John B. Grant, the Department of Public
Health at the PUMC pioneered the development of state medical
ideas in urban and rural field stations, notably at Dingxian in Hebei
province, which became the focus of a remarkable experiment in mass
education. The CME went as far as to plan a medical college specifically devoted to training students in the public and preventive health
strategies advocated by State Medicine. These initiatives were severely
curtailed by the Japanese full-scale invasions of north China starting in July 1937, but they were continued at several national medical colleges as well as through Dr. Lin’s Emergency Medical Service
Training Schools. The latter bequeathed over sixteen thousand trained
medical aides to the task of building China’s modern health services
after 1945. When one adds the thousands more medical and nursing
aides trained through the Red Army medical services, it is evident that
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China ended the war against Japan with a substantially increased reservoir of health workers trained in basic hygiene and preventive health
care, as well as physicians, public health specialists, and their political
allies capable of making this aspect of health care into a significant
feature of public policy.
The account of biomedical education that follows this introduction is part of an overall study designed to describe and assess these
initiatives during the period from roughly 1928 to 1945. It focuses on
the role played by biomedical education in creating new avenues to
health service in both the public and private sectors. While the principles of Western biomedicine and their application to public health
policy remained dominant through this period of modern China’s
history, it is clear from what follows that the war with Japan had a
major impact on how medicine was taught, to whom it was taught,
and for what purposes.
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Early Biomedical Education
in China
Modern biomedical education in China originated with apprenticeship training by Western medical missionaries to provide medical aides
for mission hospitals. With the emergence of collegiate education in the
early twentieth century, this form of medical education, along with the
Japanese two-tier model of medical professional and vocational education adopted by a few government and private schools, became the
primary system of modern Westernized biomedical training in China.
The establishment of the PUMC in 1917 introduced a powerful secular variant of the missionary college. It intensified the level of
Western influence over medical education in China while maintaining
a strong residual connection between medical and missionary work.
The PUMC adopted the model of the laboratory- and clinic-based
research and teaching enterprise that had come to define key requirements of modern medical education in the United States as a result
of the Carnegie Foundation’s Flexner report.3 This assertion of medicine as a rigorously trained and science-based undertaking, backed by
outstanding professional talent and millions of Rockefeller dollars,
soon came, through the PUMC, to exercise a powerful influence on
Westernized biomedical education in China, displacing the hitherto dominant missionary model as the leading pathway to Western
biomedical modernization.
But could the future of Westernized biomedical education in
China lie with the PUMC model, which was so foreign and specifically American in its principles, leadership, funding, and methods of
instruction? Certainly the PUMC supplied directors, teachers, and
researchers for a number of China’s other influential medical colleges,
as well as administrators for public health institutions established after
1928.4 That may be why Western study of medical modernization in
China has been understandably preoccupied with the PUMC and the
high standard and high-visibility model of biomedical education that it
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represents. At the same time, the PUMC model raises issues of cultural
and epistemological encroachment for modern Chinese nationalism
and cultural identity. To understand the evolution of medical modernization in China, one has inevitably to take broad trends into account,
including both the intensification of Western cultural influence in
China represented by the PUMC model and a countervailing process
of differentiation from Western models as the Chinese people struggled
to evolve China-centered strategies of modernization.5
This account of biomedical education explores these trends with
particular reference to two themes: The gradual nationalization of
biomedical education that took place during the Republican and
Nationalist eras (1911-1949), and the introduction and promotion
of State Medicine as an organizing principle of medical education, a
process that slowly got under way after 1928. The focus of the account
is on the period of the War of Resistance (1937-1945), when China
was forced to depend substantially on its own resources to meet the
challenges of war and national survival.6
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The Emergence of Modern
Western Biomedical Schools
Modern college-level medical education in various forms appeared
in China at the end of the nineteenth century and in the first decade of
the twentieth, at a time when the Qing dynasty was belatedly attempting to come to terms with the encroachment of Western political and
social forces. During this period, European and American missionary
societies founded medical colleges in and around Shanghai as well as
in Beijing, Jinan, Hankou, and Guangzhou (Canton). Two military
medical colleges had opened in Tianjin under official patronage, along
with army and navy medical academies in Guangdong. In 1903 professors at Beijing University established a small, Japanese-oriented civilian
medical college. A civilian medical school opened in Guangdong in
1909, and in June 1911, just a few months prior to the outbreak of the
Xinhai Revolution, the Japanese-directed South Manchuria Railway
opened a medical school in Shenyang. The foreign medical schools
had their own systems of accreditation and governance and relied on
foreign instructional materials and foreign language instruction.7
Following the establishment of the Republic in 1912 several other
government, missionary, and private medical colleges were founded in
urban centers such as Shenyang, Beijing, Baoding, Shanghai, Suzhou,
Hangzhou, Nanchang, Guangzhou, and Chengdu.8 In 1914, during
this period of expansion of Western medical education, the Rockefeller
Foundation sent a Commission to survey health conditions in China
and make recommendations for the promotion of medical education. The Commission found, first, that with one or two exceptions,
the government or private (Chinese-managed) medical schools were
“almost exclusively under Japanese influence, practically all their staff
having been trained in Japan or by Japanese teachers in China,” generally in the second-tier vocational medical schools.9 The Commission
surveyed several vocational medical schools set up under government
auspices according to the Japanese model. They were reported to have
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very limited laboratory facilities and to depend for clinical training
on small hospitals and clinics. Missionary-sponsored colleges were
regarded as somewhat better off, as the Chinese Medical Missionary Association had begun efforts to consolidate missionary medical
education into nine institutions.10 But these were all of recent origin,
with rudimentary plants and inadequate equipment and staff. Some
had high standards, but others were led by generalists declared to be
unfamiliar with modern medical advances. After visiting seventeen
medical schools and ninety-seven hospitals in China and Manila, the
Commission concluded that the Foundation should become involved
in the development of medical education in China. The most important outcome of this study was the organization of the path-breaking
PUMC in 1917.11
Unfortunately the formation of the Republic in 1912 soon led to
the breakdown of central political order and its replacement by regional warlord power blocs. Medical schools established in treaty ports were
to some extent protected from the political upheavals of the times.
But others, including those situated in Beijing, floundered, and it was
not until the formation of the Nationalist government in Nanjing in
1927 and 1928 that a new modicum of centralized order reemerged in
China.12 The new Nanjing government organized ministries of education and health staffed by reformers in a hurry to get China on the
road to modernization. In December 1929 the Ministry of Education,
in cooperation with the Ministry of Health, appointed the CME to
develop policies for consolidating and promoting medical education.13
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Issues Confronting the
Nationalist Reformers
The medical reformers turned to the League of Nations Health
Section for assistance in charting the future of medical education. Late in 1929 the Section Chief Dr. Ludwig Rajchman and a
colleague arrived in China and conducted a two-month survey of
health services and educational programs. Enthused by prospects for
reform, Rajchman reported that considerable progress had occurred
since the Rockefeller reports of 1914 and 1915. But various problems remained. Modern medical colleges and practitioners divided into several discrete linguistic subsets, each developing a certain
“corporate exclusiveness” strengthened by the use at leading national
medical schools of English, German, and French (and Japanese at the
Manchurian Medical College) as the medium of teaching.14 Also the
prolonged political upheaval had not been kind to the new medical
services. Up to 35 percent of an estimated 580 hospitals had closed
during the revolutionary years of 1926 to 1928 when fighting took
place throughout the country between the Nationalist armies and the
regional warlords. Because of such difficulties, the Chinese “Westerntrained” physicians were much more handicapped than those in other
countries of the Far East.15
The Rajchman report pointed out that modern medicine seemed
not to have attracted Chinese intellectuals, either because of their
resistance to foreign agencies or because of the low quality of most
foreign instructors and the low prestige in the Chinese medical tradition of the surgery, ophthalmology, and midwifery emphasized in
missionary medical practice. Vocational medical schools established
since 1914 had done so badly that many had ceased to function after
1926 or had since been ordered to close.16 Only one medical college
had reportedly attained standards set by the Council on Medical
Education of the Chinese Medical Association, and that was the
heavily Rockefeller-subsidized PUMC. Eight missionary schools,
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however, had registered with the Council. The report took note of
the “excellent” Japanese school in Shenyang, and in Shanghai the
“very efficient” German-founded and already national Tongji Medical College and the “high grade” French Jesuit Aurora (Chengdan)
University Medical College, both in Shanghai. It reported that the
teachers at the higher medical colleges were mostly foreign, except at
the recently founded and Chinese-staffed National Shanghai Medical
College (at that time associated with the Number Four Zhongshan
University in Nanjing).
At the end of 1929, following Rajchman’s visit, the minister of education asked him to send someone to work with the CME on the task of
raising standards and training a sufficient number of competent physicians to meet the country’s needs.17 Professor Knut Faber of Copenhagen
University took on this assignment. He visited China during the last four
months of 1930 and published a report the following year.18
Faber’s report emphasized that Western biomedicine still represented just a drop in the ocean of Chinese medical practice. There were
some four to five thousand physicians trained in “modern medicine,”
representing a ratio of one to eighty or a hundred thousand people. By
contrast there were (according to the Chinese Doctors and Druggists
Federated Association) an estimated 1.2 million Chinese medicine practitioners and 7 million pharmacists.19 Demand for modern Westernized medicine existed primarily in cities and treaty ports equipped with
hospitals and public health and quarantine bureaus and among populations more accustomed to modern and specifically foreign inroads.
Of twenty-four modern medical schools listed by the National Medical Association of China in its 1930 directory, Faber visited nineteen
and obtained information on three more. He also visited six schools
teaching Chinese medicine and reported the existence of another nine,
along with 570 organizations said to be accepting students for the
study of Chinese medicine.
Faber divided the modern Westernized group into four subsets:
Government (4), provincial (2), private (13), and military (3). His
comments were generally mixed or unfavorable. Among the govern-
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ment group, the National Medical College of Shanghai had very good
teaching but inconvenient or unsuitable clinical facilities. Conditions
at the National University Medical College in Beiping were much
worse. (The city of Beijing was renamed Beiping in 1928 by the
Nationalist government. When the Japanese occupied the city from
1937 to 1945, they called it Beijing. The new Chinese government of
the People’s Republic renamed it Beijing, its current name, in 1949.)
National Tongji Medical College, which followed the German system,
had a bad division between theoretical and clinical teaching and needed a good hospital of its own. On the second-tier provincial vocational
schools, Faber had nothing favorable to say. Predictably, he commended the PUMC and the Japanese Manchurian Medical College. The
latter offered a university-level course that in 1929 enrolled 216 Japanese students but only 23 Chinese, along with a second-tier vocational
course enrolling 107 Chinese. As for the mission schools, their aim was
still to train physicians and assistants for mission hospitals scattered
across China. All seven reportedly did good work; the Jilu Medical
College in Jinan was of the highest standard. Four private schools in
Shanghai and Canton were of a much lower standard, with practically no laboratories and dirty hospital facilities. The military medical
schools were not much better.
Faber reported that some thirty-five hundred medical students
attended these colleges. Why so few? According to him, it was because
young people had little interest in the study of medicine. The expenses
were too heavy, the entrance requirements too high, the resources of the
colleges too few.20 Faber proposed to retain the existing two-tier system
and enlarge the number of students admitted to second-tier vocational
schools. He advised against sending their graduates to rural districts to
compete with the “native” doctors, adding that modern medical ideas
were frequently seen in the practice of Chinese medicine and that basic
medical sciences were now being taught in the new schools of Chinese
medicine, based on both Chinese and Western ideas.
Faber’s advocacy of the two-tier system and his relatively positive
remarks about Chinese medicine may have struck a discordant note
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with the government reform group. The Ministry of Health was led
by modern medicine advocates who had trained at leading foreign
medical schools. These individuals were not happy about vocational
training and were adamantly opposed to the practice of Chinese medicine, because of its perceived lack of professional controls or of laboratory science foundation. Nevertheless, the CME adopted the two-tier
system as a temporary measure. But lacking a permanent secretary or
staff, it was unable to press ahead with this policy or achieve much of
an impact on existing conditions.21
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Central Government Promotion
of State Medicine
In 1935 the CME, aided by Rockefeller Foundation support, was
reorganized and provided with a permanent staff. Dr. Zhu Zhanggeng
(C. K. Chu), an able young PUMC graduate with a PhD in public
health from Yale, was appointed general secretary. Technical committees on nursing, midwifery, and health education were added, and the
Commission was supplied with a group of eight influential technical
advisers.22 With this new leadership, the CME attempted to launch
a system of medical education around which reformers could focus
their energies.
Looking out at the country as a whole, the CME saw a mortality
rate three times that of the United States, in which over 70 percent
of deaths were due to preventable diseases. Westernized biomedicine
by itself could have little impact on this problem. After one hundred
years of it, few Chinese, according to the CME, appreciated the value
of modern scientific (Westernized) medicine. The implication was that
the missionary model of hospital- and clinic-based delivery systems,
based as it was on a curative and individualized approach to health
care, simply could not do the job. The curative approach was medically
and culturally too slow. In addition it was too expensive. The average
Chinese community, it was calculated, could afford only ten cents per
capita per annum for health care.
But the preventive approach, pioneered by Chinese leaders (with
Western financial support) at Dingxian and several other model health
stations, had shown what could be accomplished through a system of
what the reformers called State Medicine. It offered a frontal response
to the morbidity and mortality problems that could function within
existing systems of governance at acceptable economic costs. As a societal rather than individualized strategy, it fitted in better with Chinese
administrative and cultural norms, and even though Western in ideological origin, it would be taken over and managed by Chinese. Last,
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and certainly not least, it was modern and came with international
endorsement from the League of Nations as well as from U.S. foundations. For reasons such as these, one can understand why the whole
concept of State Medicine would appear so attractive to the government’s CME reformers and why they were so eager to endorse it.
In 1935 the CME developed an ambitious plan to staff and
promote state medical service in rural areas. The plan relied on advances in rural reconstruction (through changes in land tenure and rural
government). In the 1930s a vast gap stood between existing conditions and declared goals; thus it was only in Sichuan that significant
progress occurred at an almost province-wide level. Still, it is significant—and not well known—that a Nationalist government ministry authorized the promotion of a comprehensive system of publicly
sponsored community health service.23 By 1935 State Medicine had
become the prevailing goal of China’s medical service reformers, thus
providing an alternative to the laboratory-based model of institutions
such as the PUMC, as well as to the hospital service training carried
out at missionary medical schools. Yet at this time the promoters of
State Medicine were all graduates of mainstream experimental research
and teaching institutions in China or abroad and were committed to
furtherance of laboratory-based clinical medicine at the higher levels of
biomedical education. Public and preventive health training remained
then and later a low priority in most medical education curricula.
In surveying medical education in China at that time, the CME
reported that there were twenty-seven medical colleges divided into
three types24: The college type (nineteen), which offered high school
seniors a six-year curriculum and a medical degree; the second-tier
medical vocational school (six), which offered a four-year curriculum
and no degree and for which an additional one-year practicum was
required for a diploma; and finally one or two so-called medical schools
operating in border provinces at marginal standards. The difference in
quality was graphically demonstrated by the range in annual budgets,
which varied from $2,657,380 to $58,803. The former belonged to
the PUMC and was in a class by itself. The next highest budget shown
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was that of the National Zhongshan University Medical College
($537,000). Excluding the PUMC, the average budget of the seventeen other schools was $191,000.25 Thus at this time budget revenues
heavily favored Western-controlled colleges, enabling them to continue
exercising a leading influence over Westernized biomedical education.26
As to teaching staff, the CME reported 706 instructors in 19 institutions, of whom 120 were foreign, 230 were returned students (88
from Japan, 66 from the United States, and 51 from Germany), and
365 local graduates. Basic science laboratories were reported to be
generally insufficient and completely lacking in one or two schools.
Only two institutions regularly carried out autopsies. With the exception of two or three, none of the teaching hospitals was well organized.
Most schools lacked both a public health teaching field and a properly
developed and utilized library.
In April 1936 the CME convened a conference of medical school
directors to see what could be done about this situation. Over a threeday period the participants discussed curricula and syllabuses and the
difficulty of recruiting students into the second-tier vocational schools.
Various site visits were made to newly established health agencies
in Nanjing, including one to the recently relocated Army Medical
College, where the effects of a new American-oriented curriculum and
staff were reported to be a “revelation.”27 The participants recommended the establishment of an experimental medical school that
could demonstrate the proposed new system for training personnel for
State Medicine. Meanwhile, the CME pressed forward with site visits
and publications designed to promote State Medicine training and
improve medical teaching. Ten fellowships were offered to improve
teaching in the basic sciences.
During the next academic year the CME went ahead with the planning of a demonstration college. A preparatory committee was organized, consisting of three leading advocates of State Medicine: Drs.
Lin Kesheng, Chen Zhiqian, and the CME’s executive secretary Zhu
Zhanggeng. The first two were on the faculty of the PUMC. Chen had
been responsible for developing the Dingxian rural health program28;
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Lin, already an internationally respected physiologist, had taken the
lead in developing frontline medical rescue teams for the Chinese
Red Cross. The government appropriated funds for buildings, and
the Jiangxi provincial government donated over two hundred acres of
land in Nanchang. The College was designed to train physicians, vocational health workers, and village aides, along the lines advocated by
the CME.29 To emphasize its significance as a state-sponsored enterprise, the College was named National Zhongzheng Medical College
after the formal name of President Chiang Kai-shek. By this time the
possibility of a full-scale Japanese invasion of China seemed ever more
likely. Nevertheless, the College opened in spring 1937, just as war was
about to break out.30
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Nationalization of Medical
Colleges
The National Zhongzheng Medical College was the first to adopt
formally the goals of State Medicine, but not the first to be directly
supervised by the national government. As early as September 1927
a group of medical patriots, imbued by the concept of “education for
national salvation” and seeking to establish a completely Chinesemanaged university-level institution, had set up a medical college
in a suburb of Shanghai as one of the eight constituent colleges of
the National Central University in Nanjing (at that time called the
Number Four Zhongshan University). The college realized a dream
contemplated by the Rockefeller Commission twelve years earlier but
abandoned because of the expenses lavished on the founding of the
PUMC. One of China’s leading Western-trained medical scientists
and educators, Dr. Yan Fuqing (F. C. Yen), was appointed director. The college started with eight staff and twenty-nine students;
they were drawn from the Xiangya (Hunan–Yale) college in Changsha, which was at that time suspended; St. John’s University Medical College in Shanghai; the PUMC; and the Jiangsu Special Medical College. Financial aid was obtained from provincial treasuries and
private citizens, the China Foundation (U.S. Boxer Indemnity Fund),
the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Chinese Red Cross.31 In 1932,
during the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, the College’s buildings
and an ambulance were destroyed and a large portion of its equipment
lost. Fortunately the college was able to reestablish itself on another
site with financial support from various Chinese and foreign donors.
It became an independent foundation with its own teaching hospital,
schools of pharmacy and nursing, and a public health training field site
(the Gaoqiao [Kaochiao] model health district).32
In 1935 the government set up a new National Central University
Medical College, this time in Nanjing. Dr. Qi Shounan (S. N. Cheer),
a Johns Hopkins–trained clinician who was then chief of the medical
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service in the Central Hospital in Nanjing, was appointed president.
The college began without buildings of its own, but in 1936 some
were erected to accommodate the preclinical departments. The college
conducted two years of preclinical education before the outbreak of
war in 1937 necessitated a radical change in plans.33
The government had also brought under national direction several medical schools originally founded under private auspices. These
included the medical college of National Zhongshan University in
Canton, an originally private foundation incorporated into the university in 1927 and provided with several German professors in the
basic medical sciences and a curriculum and library oriented towards
German language instruction.34 In Shanghai the German-founded
Tongji Medical College had begun to come under Chinese government
control as early as 1917, when diplomatic relations between China and
Germany were severed. After the war, relations with German agencies were reestablished, and the college continued to follow a German
curriculum. In May 1927 it was confirmed by the Nationalist government as the medical college of a national university.35 In Beijing the
special medical college originally founded in 1903 was reorganized in
1927 as the medical college of the National University of Beiping.36
In Wuhan plans were under way to develop a medical college at the
National Wuhan University when the war with Japan broke out.37 In
1938 the Wuhan medical college was reconstituted in Guiyang as an
independent national medical college.38
Thus by the time that war broke out in July 1937 some progress had been made in the development of a national medical educational system. An active CME had been created with a distinctive
philosophy and a plan for putting it into operation. At the national
level eight colleges (including a National College of Pharmacy) were
functioning or about to function under the aegis of the Ministry
of Education. Another seven provincial medical colleges or medical vocational schools existed,39 along with fourteen missionary or
private medical colleges and three military medical institutions. At
least fourteen colleges additionally offered premedical courses.40
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With the exception of the PUMC, none of these colleges was well
equipped or funded (since the Japanese occupation of northeast
China in September 1931 the colleges in that area had been removed
from Chinese jurisdiction, but at least half possessed experienced and
competent staff ). On the other hand, as the CME’s second annual
report pointed out, over 30 percent of the medical and midwifery
schools were concentrated in Jiangsu province, particularly in Shanghai, and half of China’s territory was devoid of any form of modern
biomedical institution. To correct this imbalance, the CME wanted
to divide China into five regions (north, mid-south, mid-east, southeast, south, and west) and identify or establish a competent medical
school that would become the central school of each region.41 Before
long, this idea would become an urgent necessity.
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Crisis and Reorganization
The outbreak of war in July 1937 radically transformed China’s
existence. Bitterly fought campaigns around Shanghai and Nanjing left
large areas of those cities devastated. The Chinese armies were forced
to retreat, leaving civilian populations at the mercy of the invader. In
the north the military campaigns were accompanied by massive flooding and natural devastation, spreading disease and sending millions
into flight as refugees.42 The Nationalist government was forced to
withdraw to Central China and thence to the mountain stronghold
of Chongqing in Sichuan. In Chongqing it was beyond the reach of
Japan’s armies but not of its planes, which bombed the city mercilessly. A war of attrition ensued, in which the Japanese forces dominated
the eastern cities and communication routes, aided by a pro–Japanese
regime in Nanjing. Nationalist military forces continued to hold sway
in the southwest and northwest, while Communist forces carried on
guerrilla warfare in northern and eastern China.
At first the war inspired a wave of patriotic resistance, which united the population and many of its warring factions behind the leadership of the Nationalist government and its Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek. This unity was soon eroded by internal political conflicts
and the damaging effects of a prolonged military stalemate. As the war
progressed, the Japanese succeeded in blocking unoccupied China all
the way from the northeast to northern Burma, forcing the Chongqing government to depend on the precarious and expensive lifeline of
the trans–Burma air “hump.” Inflation set in, rising dramatically and
irreversibly as the war continued.
Quite apart from its political effects, the war caused a seismic
upheaval in China’s social and economic life. Whole populations
were uprooted, institutions torn from their moorings, and buildings
and equipment reduced to rubble. In addition to the mass migrations of refugees and orphans, many of China’s intelligentsia joined
the retreat to western China, where they continued their work under
increasingly impoverished circumstances. During the first four years
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of the war, foreign support was limited very largely to unofficial
voluntary assistance, creating in the minds of many politically aware
Chinese a sense of international isolation and abandonment. Nationalism intensified until the impoverishing inflation overwhelmed all
other considerations.
All this upheaval took its toll on medical institutions and their
participants. But the responses and fortunes of each institution varied
substantially, depending on qualities of leadership, institutional spirit,
sense of vocation, international contacts, and less predictable factors
such as developments in the military campaigns. Although the Japanese
military made a point of attacking hospitals and medical units (including ambulances identified with red crosses), modern biomedicine in
China survived the war and was in various ways transformed by it.
At the CME a reorganization occurred within a year of the outbreak
of war, after the government replaced an internationalist minister of
education with a leader of the conservative wing of the Nationalist
Party, Chen Lifu. Despite frantic lobbying, Dr. Zhu Zhanggeng was
ousted and replaced by the German-trained Dr. Wang Yuanchen. At
that time Dr. Wang was president of the Jiangsu Provincial College
of Medicine, of which Chen Lifu and his brother Chen Guofu were
the founders.43 Much to the horror of the reformers, representatives
of colleges of Chinese medicine were brought onto the Commission and its standing committee. These changes reflected the strong
interest in Chinese medicine in conservative circles of the Nationalist
Party and Chen’s determination to give them a voice in government
education policy.44 To add to the discomfiture of the reformers, the
NHA had been once again demoted in January 1938 to a department
within the Interior Ministry, and its forceful director-general Dr. Liu
Ruiheng replaced by the older and more cautious Yan Fuqing. Thus
the new leaders of the Education Ministry could reorganize the CME
without worrying too much about pressure from the Public Health
establishment. Foreign observers such as the Rockefeller Foundation’s
representative and public health expert Dr. John B. Grant, who had a
personal interest in State Medicine, persuaded themselves that the new
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CME would follow the underlying principles of the old CME’s prewar
policy. Consequently the Rockefeller Foundation, despite reservations,
continued to support the CME program.45
Despite these upheavals the CME did not lose sight of its responsibilities to the medical colleges, several of which had been severely
affected by the onslaught of war. The 1938 report provided a graphic
tabulation of the effect of one year of hostilities on thirty-three institutions. One had been completely wiped out, six suspended, and two
“more or less” suspended. Except for seven (and one other not listed),
all the rest were no longer in their prewar locations, and several of the
colleges still occupying their campuses were planning imminent moves.
The CME itself had been forced to abandon its offices in Nanjing,
taking only a few important documents and drafts of textbooks. Its
members had had to take on emergency work, resulting in a paralysis
of administrative function for four months.46
The crises to which China’s modern medical colleges would now
have to become accustomed can be illustrated by citing some specific
instances. Japanese bombing of Nanchang (the capital city of Jiangxi
province) forced the fledgling National Zhongzheng Medical College to
retreat to the small rural town of Yongxin in west central Jiangxi. It was
then ordered by the central government to relocate in Kunming, capital of Yunnan province in southwest China (and 750 miles away from
Yongxin as the crow flies), where it resumed teaching at the end of 1938
in “hastily constructed pavilions.” The Japanese campaign in Burma led
to the bombing of Kunming in 1940, as a result of which the college
moved to Zhenning in Guizhou province. Because of repeated requests
from the Jiangxi provincial government, it moved back to Yongxin in
autumn of 1941, where it rented space in local temples.
During these wanderings, the college, never well endowed to begin
with, had to abandon large amounts of chemicals, laboratory supplies,
and instruments. As Yongxin’s hospital was too small, the college did its
clinical teaching at a 180-bed provincial hospital at Taihe, ninety kilometers away, which was frequently disturbed by air raids. The China
Medical Board (CMB) representative Dr. Claude Forkner, visiting in
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December 1943, found students eating a meal of rice, two tablespoons
of bean sprouts, and some salty water for soup. Owing to lack of furniture and equipment, they all ate standing up. At that time a typhoid
epidemic was ravaging the district, and according to Forkner many
of the students were critically ill. Nevertheless the college succeeded
in graduating its first class of twenty-two members and had another
class of forty-three serving as interns in various hospitals. Its numbers
had been increased by refugee students from medical colleges in Hong
Kong, Canton, Shanghai, and Fujian, of whom half had become State
Medicine students.47
In another case, National Tongji University Medical College had
its campus destroyed by Japanese bombs and shells during the assault
on Shanghai in 1937. The College moved to Jinhua (Zhejiang), then
to Ganzhou (southwest Jiangxi), and then to Kunming in China’s far
southwestern province of Yunnan.48 Japanese bombing of that city
resulted in a further move late in 1940 to Yibin, a prefectural city
adjoining the Yangtze River in southern Sichuan. Owing to all these
migrations from one place to another, reported the dean, the college
suffered numerous (unspecified) losses.
In Yibin, the college, like many others elsewhere, had no running
water and employed coolies to fetch water from the Yangtze. It had a
sixty-bed teaching hospital, onto which it built a large operating house
in the winter of 1942. In summer 1943 the latter was destroyed by a
flood, reducing the hospital to forty-nine beds. The college hospital had
an x-ray unit but no film and no spare x-ray tubes. Most of the faculty
suffered from malaria, but none had resigned. Student nutrition was very
unsatisfactory. Yet by 1943 the college had produced 585 graduates, and
it had at that time 272 medical students in residence, most of them
from occupied areas. Its senior faculty, most of whom had had postgraduate experience in leading German medical schools, were making
do with rudimentary equipment and, when necessary, dictating notes to
students. Despite these discouraging circumstances, college bacteriologists carried out and published research on the etiology of “pa” disease (a
paralysis associated with food poisoning) in southwest Sichuan.49
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Organization of Wartime Medical
Centers in Nationalist China
Once the CME had been reconstituted in Chongqing in 1938, it
drew up a wartime program to reorganize medical education in four
key centers. One of the first such sites was at Chengdu, at the home
of the missionary-founded West China Union University Medical and
Dental College. The two-year-old National Central University Medical College was dismantled and moved to Chengdu in advance of the
abandonment of Nanjing. At the missionary Jilu Medical College
(originally Cheeloo) in Jinan, Shandong, 85 percent of the students and
fourteen Chinese staff also relocated at West China.50 The West China
College was a well-established institution, having opened in 1914 and
united with the University’s Dental College in 1929. As Rockefeller
Foundation representative, Dr. Grant, visiting in April 1938, reported that the college had 320 students and a $400,000 budget. It had
recently received external grants from the CME, the provincial government, the China Foundation, and the British Boxer Fund amounting
to $90,000. By that time, the college had opened its doors to several
other institutions besides Jilu and National Central Medical College.
Grant noted that “this will be the only stable medical school behind
the Chinese lines. It should be strengthened.”51 Despite difficulties
in accommodation and in integrating different curricula, the CME
concluded optimistically in its July to December 1938 report that the
experiment in collaboration at Chengdu had proved a success.52
The second center was at Guiyang, capital of Guizhou province.
This became the home of the new National Guiyang Medical College,
the Xiangya (Hunan–Yale) Medical College, and two NHA institutions, the Public Health Personnel Training Institute and the Central
Hospital, which served as the local teaching hospital for the Xiangya
College.53 A large Red Cross and army training establishment was situated at Tuyun’guan, not far outside the city. The National Guiyang
Medical College had actually been initiated by the NHA on the
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request of the recently appointed governor of Guizhou, who was eager
to promote modernization in a notoriously poor and backward region.
The college opened with a budget of $250,000, consisting of $110,000
reallocated from the suspended National Wuhan University Medical
College, $90,000 from the British Boxer Fund, and $50,000 from the
China Foundation. In accordance with the State Medicine plan, the
college was set up in two parts: A medical college and a vocational
school combining courses in nursing and midwifery. Two hundred
eighty students were enrolled from over fifty medical, nursing, and
midwifery schools54 (another source lists 227 medical, 37 nursing,
and 39 midwifery students). Prior to 1938, Guiyang was at most an
outpost of modern biomedicine in a province having in all less than a
dozen “qualified” (i.e., modern registered) physicians. The war was to
transform Guiyang into an important medical center, and no matter
what happened to the other institutions, it was intended that National Guiyang Medical College should stay there. The college began in
temporary bamboo and straw structures, with its teaching hospital and
vocational school in an old guild house and administrative offices in a
nearby temple. More permanent buildings were gradually erected on a
site outside the city.55
A third regional center was established at Kunming, capital of
China’s southwest province of Yunnan. The CME directed three
national medical colleges to relocate in that city, where they were
expected to cooperate with a newly created medical college of Yunnan
University and a provincial school of midwifery. A fourth college,
National Zhongshan University Medical College, moved to a nearby town. As mentioned above, the Zhongzheng and Tongji medical
colleges made their way to Kunming only to have to move again in
1940. The third national medical college directed to Kunming was
National Shanghai. This assignment proved easier to propose than to
carry out. After some years in the international settlement, the college
had moved to new quarters in the Chinese city of Shanghai. After war
broke out, the former director, Dr. Yan Fuqing, moved all the equipment and library back to the International Settlement where the college
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was protected from destruction. The Japanese in turn had moved into
the Chinese quarters, where they set up a base hospital.56
When Dr. Yan was appointed director of the demoted NHA, Dr.
Zhu Hengbi (H. P. Chu), the college’s academic dean and one of the
most articulate of China’s internationally trained medical leaders,
became acting director of the college. According to Grant, instruction
of the college’s 120 students continued fairly well under the circumstances. Plans for the move to Kunming proceeded slowly, and it was
not until the summer of 1939 that the three senior clinical year classes
set off. According to the new Rockefeller Foundation representative,
Dr. M. C. Balfour, the college had reluctantly concluded that in future
years a “national school” remaining outside of unoccupied China might
be less esteemed in national circles and might find itself in a fix if it
remained in a foreign concession area. But, reported Balfour, only half
the students would leave without pressure. Overtures from the Wang
Jingwei puppet regime in Nanjing may have helped to precipitate the
move.57 The preclinical and premedical classes did not leave Shanghai
until the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941, when the
foreign settlements were seized; by that time the clinical group had relocated outside of Chongqing. This time over ninety students were evacuated, along with the majority of the basic medical science teachers.58
The last proposed regional medical center was at Chongqing itself.
The CME’s 1938 plan called for the National School of Pharmacy
and the National Central Midwifery School to be moved there. The
following year the National Jiangsu Medical College (formed by an
amalgam of two provincial colleges) moved to a site near Chongqing.59 But the importance of Chongqing as a medical center would
derive from the reestablishment near the city of the NHA and several
of its most important subunits, including a central hospital and in
due course the Public Health Personnel Training Institute, which had
previously been situated in Guiyang. The relocation to Chongqing of
National Shanghai Medical College brought another powerful institutional player onto the scene and helped to increase Dr. Zhu Hengbi’s
influence over the evolution of medical policy.
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In early 1939 Dr. Grant recorded in his diary that the government
was responding to the lessons of the war by developing an internal
policy of reconstruction through resistance. The source of this information was the president of National Central University Luo Jialun,
a senior official with close ties to Chiang Kai-shek. According to Mr.
Luo the idea was to press development in the northwest and to “initiate
Chinese socio-economic measures in place of the previous EuropeanAmerican ones.”60 To follow up on this policy the CME endeavored to
consolidate the reorganizations outlined above and to develop a fiveyear plan to double the number of individuals in medical service. Dr.
Yan Fuqing wrote enthusiastically to a Rockefeller Foundation executive about the Kunming center: It combined five medical schools, it
could deal with Yunnan’s “major health problems,” and it could lay
the foundation for a national medical school.61 To compensate for a
30 percent cut in the budgets of the government medical colleges, the
CME offered nonfinancial subsidies towards equipment and staff living
expenses. It approached the Rockefeller Foundation with a request for
an additional monetary grant. Refugee students from occupied areas
were permitted to enter any medical colleges registered with the CME.
Student loans were provided to assist refugee students in resettling.
To promote training in midwifery, the CME assisted the Sichuan
provincial government in setting up a provincial vocational school in
Chengdu. In view of the “urgent need” to promote rural health work
in the interior of China, the CME organized five one-year classes to
train midwives and nursing aides.62
Yet in July 1939 the student loans were discontinued, and all new
graduates of registered medical colleges were ordered to report to the
Ministry of Education for wartime assignments. (It is doubtful that any
enforcement mechanism was in place to back up this directive). In 1940
the government health organizations underwent further reshuffling. In
April the NHA was re-elevated to a subcabinet level agency, and in July
the CME was reorganized. Dr. Jin Baoshan (P. Z. King), a conciliatory
and tireless administrator who would shortly become director general of the NHA, was appointed the senior medical representative of a
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five-member standing committee revised to favor modern biomedical
expertise. Committees on health education and Chinese medicine were
set up (the former had apparently been allowed to lapse). The previously provincial and mission-sponsored Xiangya Medical College was
taken on as a national institution and provided with an annual government appropriation. As a result of Japanese bombing the Kunming
medical center had broken up, leaving only the medical college of
Yunnan University, which, according to a December 1940 report, had
been heavily bombed and sustained almost irremediable losses. The
CME introduced its five-year plan to double the number of people in
medical service in ten years, along with tentative regulations governing
medical students intending to become public physicians. They were to
be exempted from tuition and board expenses but required to serve the
public sector for double the length of their medical college residence.
Registration of nonpublic-sector students was henceforth not to exceed
20 percent of enrollment.63
The changes in leadership at the CME left some observers less
than satisfied. Dr. Jin in a letter to Dr. Balfour wrote that two of his
colleagues on the standing committee were “too nice” and that neither
possessed a strong personality. Balfour, meanwhile, had taken a dislike
to the general secretary, Dr. Wang, regarding him as incompetent and
ineffective. He informed Dr. Jin that the standing committee still did
“not inspire too much confidence.”64 The Rockefeller Foundation was
now looking for a way to disengage from an organization in which it
was losing confidence. In May 1941 Balfour wrote to Wang informing
him that aid to the CME had been terminated and that future aid to
medical education would “presumably” be through direct contact with
the medical schools.65
The main reason for the Foundation’s dissatisfaction seems to have
been the CME’s declining commitment to State Medicine. The previous general secretary, Dr. Zhu Zhanggeng, had been a zealous advocate
of State Medicine and had had the support of an activist NHA. Dr.
Wang had no comparable public health background. He worked for
political leaders more interested in Chinese medicine than in the State
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Medicine advocated by public health reformers and felt little pressure
from a weakened and subordinated NHA. There is little in Dr. Wang’s
reports to suggest that during his administration State Medicine was
at the forefront of CME policy. Dr. Wang seems also to have let some
of the Committee work slide, but that was clearly not the primary
irritant. When Dr. Grant visited China in 1942 he noted the slippage
in commitment to State Medicine. The CME came in for particularly
strong criticism from Grant because of its failure to coordinate medical
education with promotion of State Medicine.66
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Evolution of Biomedical
Education in Wartime China
The problems experienced by the CME were part of a larger picture
of stress and strain endured during the war by all of Nationalist China’s
health institutions and, indeed, by the entire country. By 1939 the war
had entered a period of military stalemate. In order to frustrate the
advance of Japanese mechanized columns, Nationalist Chinese forces
had destroyed lines of communication between east and west, making
travel and transportation on both sides considerably more difficult.
After the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 and the Japanese seizure of Burma during the spring of 1942, it became more and
more difficult to get civilian medical supplies into China or to move
them to where they were needed. The medical colleges had to make
do without scientific journals and books, as well as rely increasingly
on what little supplies and equipment could be made locally. The plan
to consolidate institutions in several central locations ran up against
differences in institutional cultures that could not be easily ironed out.
Outbursts of renewed military violence caused further migrations of
medical colleges right up until the end of the war in 1945, by which
time those that had come from central and east China were eagerly
planning to return to their original locations.
Probably the greatest stress came from the intensifying inflation,
which strained salaries and stipends to the limit, driving many faculty
members to divert their time into more lucrative private practice, while
others simply left the medical teaching profession. As these trends
continued, senior officials and educators became more and more fearful of a decline in medical educational standards.67
To some extent the economic pressures on medical agencies were
mitigated by increasing amounts of foreign and largely American financial aid, channeled principally through the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China (ABMAC) and the CMB. The government continued to promote the development of regional and provincial medical
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centers. During this period several provinces and districts in southwest
China substantially expanded their health services. In the northwest
the foundation of a major medical center, including a new national
medical college, began in Lanzhou, the capital of Gansu province. The
growing needs of the military and public health services necessitated a
continuing influx of medical school graduates, in part to offset losses
of staff to private practice. The medical colleges attempted in various
ways to meet these exigencies.
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Two Case Studies
It may help to illustrate these processes by looking at the experience
of two colleges, one giving strong emphasis to clinical and laboratorybased medical education, the other more oriented to promotion of rural
and community state medical services. The colleges are selected partly
because the contrast in their priorities and experience is relatively clear,
and partly because the documentation available for this study is better
for these two colleges than for others and thus permits the development of more fully formed profiles.

National Central University
Medical College
The National Central University Medical College had settled in
Chengdu—even though the rest of the University had relocated in
Chongqing—largely because of the receptive attitude of the wellestablished missionary West China Union University Medical College.
But it was not long before basic differences between a predominantly
missionary enterprise and an assertive national medical school began to
make themselves felt. Only a year after arriving in Chengdu, National
Central’s director, Dr. Qi Shounan, told Dr. Grant that he was dissatisfied with the arrangement because of the “technical incompatibilities”
of the West China missionary faculty.68 An outside Chinese observer
told Grant that the chief problem was the generally poor intellectual and academic qualifications of the West China faculty, who were
mostly “haphazard” missionaries put into academic positions. West
China was an “amateur institution” with too low standards, but, as the
host college, it refused to acknowledge its academic incompetence.69
A Western missionary leader, agreeing with Chinese criticisms, told
Grant that many foreign missionaries felt that the Chengdu group
were in the evolutionary stage of coastal missions prior to World
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War I.70 The Chinese chair of West China’s Department of Public
Health complained that a foreign mission hospital superintendent
had upset proposals for cooperation with government agencies, due
to the superintendent’s dictatorial temperament.
The medical dean of West China, Dr. Leslie Kilborn, was a highly
credentialed physiologist with MD and PhD degrees from the University of Toronto and virtually bilingual qualifications, having been born
in Sichuan. He had translated a physiology textbook into Chinese
and produced a laboratory manual of physiology. Dr. Kilburn tried
hard to promote collaboration with West China’s guest institutions,
but despite his cross-cultural skills he was unable to bridge differences
in cultural and professional orientation.71 As Grant summed it up,
the hosts complained that the guests were displacing the hosts; the
guests complained that the hosts did not understand the administrative
set-up needed for teaching. Both were right, but, Grant implied, the
guests more so. The mission hospitals, he said, lacked an understanding of clinical teaching, indeed had never heard of the house system
(of residency-level appointments, combining supervised clinical care
with specialist training) in a teaching hospital. Of all the large group of
European “clinicians” at West China there was only one, at the time of
the arrival of the refugee institutions, with the training requisite for a
senior teaching position.72
Under these circumstances it was only a matter of time before a
split became inevitable. In summer 1941 Dr. Qi decided to move
National Central off the West China campus and out of the currently
united teaching hospital. He took over two evacuated middle school
buildings, where the college set up its preclinical teaching and a twohundred-bed teaching hospital. A forty-three-bed surgical hospital was
set up in a big private residence.73
These moves provoked a good deal of ill feeling among the West
China group, who felt they had gone out of their way to recognize
National Central by accepting Dr. Qi as director of clinical studies
and director of the united hospital system. In a spirited defense they
agreed that the destruction by fire of one of the mission hospitals had
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left the joint colleges with insufficient clinical facilities. But a marked
tendency had developed for clinical staff to engage in outside practice,
and this was “especially evident” among the National Central staff.74
The implication was that the National Central group had left to seek
richer rewards. Their secession was “most unfortunate . . . . Their
hospitals now compete with ours, they compete for government grants
and relief funds . . . . They failed to assume their share of the costs of
certain renovations . . . .”
The charge of moonlighting by medical college faculties became
widely reported during the inflationary later war years and seems to
have dogged the National Central faculty more than most. A Rockefeller Foundation agent visiting Chengdu in May 1943 reported that
National Central clinical faculty members were all doing private practice. The junior staff members were dissatisfied because the seniors
had the most lucrative practices. Incomes of some were larger than
¥50,000 a month (Chinese currency), including 40 percent commission on drugs.75 Supporting this view, CMB representative Dr.
Forkner wrote that National Central’s teachers seemed to have lost
interest in teaching and for the most part engaged in private practice
or business, to the neglect of their university duties. Forkner claimed
he was told that this was begun by Dr. Qi, who was heavily engaged
in private practice in Nanjing even before the war. It was alleged that
Dr. Qi made ¥30,000 to ¥60,000 per month in practice. According
to Forkner, Dr. Qi denied he was earning income from private practice, but nobody believed him. The situation at West China, Forkner
added, was believed to be equally bad. With one exception, all did it
under cover. The problem was that the official salaries and subsidies
were far too small to maintain teachers as teachers.76
The problem of moonlighting is illuminated in the reports of Dr.
Chen Zhiqian, at that time Commissioner of Health for Sichuan
province. According to Nanjing University data cited by Dr. Chen,
the price index rose from 108.7 in December 1938 to 218,310 in
November 1945.77 The effect of this pressure was to drive medical
practitioners out of salaried positions into private practice. Already by
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June 1941 a number of Chen’s staff whose salaries were under ¥400
a month had resigned.78 In 1942 public health courses for physicians
and nurses were suspended because participants were not interested
in courses that could not help to improve their income.79 By then the
phenomenal rise in prices had “forced many people to go back to oldfashioned (i.e., private) medical practice, regardless of its value.”80 By
the end of 1942 over 30 percent of the provincial health officers had
left the service.81
In 1943 inflation overshadowed all other issues, causing a “continuous drop of moral and technical standards.”82 By 1944, reported
Chen, even public health leaders (supposedly focused on preventive
health care strategies) were retreating into the time-honored practice
of medical relief (i.e., care, potentially lucrative, for sick townspeople).
The popular slogan in any medical school was curative medicine, and
private practitioners were making fortunes out of the many profiteering merchants and landlords. Professors of medical colleges gained
their reputations by the size of their private practices, and ambitious
medical students watched them with admiration.83 By then ¥100,000
or more could be charged for an appendectomy, ¥10,000 to ¥50,000
for tonsillectomy, and ¥30,000 for a normal childbirth delivery in a
teaching hospital. Internists obtained a 50 percent commission on
each prescription. The financial temptation of curative medicine—
frequently “unscientific”—was “terrific.”84
Summing up, Chen concluded that “the longer the war, the worse
the inflation and the greater the tendency towards medical relief.
Under the present influences, medical relief of an inferior kind is flourishing in many parts of this country. Extraordinary statesmanship will
be required to change the present viewpoint.”85
National Central’s problems were not limited to moonlighting.
In February 1942 the Japanese closed down the PUMC in Beiping,
depriving the national medical colleges of a valuable source of welltrained and experimentally grounded faculty. In April the CMB,
which was the primary source of the PUMC’s funds, set aside $25,000
in emergency aid for staff and students traveling to southwest China.86
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Only a small number made use of this assistance. By September there
were seven medical and three nursing students and one professor and
two nursing instructors in Free (meaning unoccupied) China.87 Efforts
to reconstitute the PUMC in Free China never got off the ground,
partly because most faculty reportedly preferred to remain in Beiping
in private practice or laboratory work, because the economic conditions were said to be less difficult there.88 By January 1943 arrivals
from Beiping included thirteen graduate fellows and nurses and thirteen medical and two nursing students. But by the end of March, one
year after the PUMC’s suspension, an increasing number of its undergraduates were coming to Free China.89
These students were channeled by PUMC advisers to National
Central, which was felt to have the most prestigious faculty and the
best equipment and to reflect most closely the PUMC’s priorities. But
within a very few months this policy foundered over campus conditions
and administrative requirements. PUMC students, by now numbering
thirty-five, complained that they were not learning anything at National Central. Ward rounds were conducted in ten or twenty minutes and
rarely lasted one hour. No clinicians were around the hospital in the
afternoons. The library facilities were very poor. The dormitories were
crowded, poorly lit, and infested with bedbugs.90 On top of these problems the National Central authorities had refused to recognize PUMC
matriculation as equivalent to National Central’s and were insisting
that PUMC students take examinations in physics, chemistry, and
histology, even though there were no facilities to prepare for them.
They also insisted that no PUMC student could receive a diploma
until he or she had spent three years at National Central.91
The upshot was that the majority of PUMC students decided
to transfer to West China, where they were warmly welcomed. Dr.
Forkner supported this move on the grounds that the National Central
staff had been spending practically no time in teaching, the facilities
were poor, and the students were learning nothing. He liked West
China, arguing that it had better facilities—among them an excellent
medical library—and that it was relatively free from political maneu-
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vering.92 Dr. Qi, for his part, explained the situation on the grounds
that West China conferred an MD degree as compared to National
Central’s MB. Its graduates were not subject to a five-year commitment to work in the state medical service, and National Central’s living
quarters were not as good. He brushed aside the problems in entrance
requirements but did admit that his staff were getting “very restless”
about the opportunities in private practice.93 A colleague of Dr. Qi’s
pointed out to CMB officials that thirteen of the PUMC students had
not spent over one year at the PUMC, and that little was known about
what they had been doing between February 1942 and spring 1943.94
The dispute over the location of the refugee PUMC students triggered an uneasy debate between Dr. Balfour (the Rockefeller Foundation representative) and Dr. Forkner (the CMB representative) about
the merits of the national medical college system. Balfour, whose
thinking was much in line with Grant’s, argued that foreigners must go
along with the “national movement and spirit in China,” even though
there might be disadvantages and slow progress at times. Forkner, on
the spot and never one to take criticism lightly, countered that the
question was, where could one best train leaders in medicine and related subjects? He would go along with the national spirit and movement
if they led in the direction of progress in medical education, otherwise
not.95 But elsewhere Forkner made it clear that he distrusted the trend
towards nationalization of higher education in Free China, claiming
that the chief effect was more centralized control.96
Despite such problems, National Central clung to its role as a leading national medical college, and under Dr. Qi’s astute and assertive
leadership it was able to retain its clinical faculty and obtain funds to
support basic medical science teaching and research. A 1944 report
showed that the college had 432 students (up from 374 in 1943), 294
staff (up from 273), and 176 hospital beds. Its library had 2,140 books,
of which 1,365 were in English. Faculty publications included a textbook in physiology, a laboratory manual for pharmacology, and popular pamphlets on a variety of medical subjects.97 Departmental reports
indicate that the Department of Parasitology in 1943 carried out a
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field survey and laboratory study of schistosomiasis in Sichuan.98 The
Department of Public Health published in 1944 two issues of Modern
Medicine Quarterly, which were widely distributed in the province.99
The Department of Physiology and Pharmacology, in addition to
the publications noted above, reported several research studies, including one on the toxicity of DDT. Its chairman, Dr. Cai Qiao (C. Tsai),
published eight articles during the war years in Chinese and American journals.100 A professor in the Department of Anatomy published
various studies on the racial anatomy of the Chinese in the American
Journal of Physiological Anatomy.101 The Department of Biochemistry
analyzed more than 150 kinds of Chengdu foods.102 The following
year the Department of Public Health undertook several epidemiological studies, including an analysis of the birth weight of newborn infants
and an analysis of pathogens in soybean sauce.103
All this work and more was supported by the assiduous fundraising of Dr. Qi. Between 1942 and 1946, he obtained $126,055 from
the CMB, substantially more than any other medical college.104 Dr. Qi
also obtained significant U.S. dollar grants from ABMAC, which were
used to subsidize his full-time basic medical science staff.105 The college
and its teaching hospital published detailed and in some cases exhaustive reports, testifying to the managerial competence and clinical focus
of its administration.106 In short, despite all its difficulties (and they
were many), National Central stuck to its scientific goals and remained
throughout the war a standard-bearer for the Western and specifically
American model of clinical and laboratory-based biomedical education.

National Xiangya Medical College
A rather different set of problems and responses can be seen from
reviewing the records of the Xiangya Medical College in southwest
China’s Guizhou province, in the city of Guiyang. This college had
been founded in 1914 through the cooperation of the Yale medical
mission in Changsha, led by Dr. Edward H. Hume, and a Chinese
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association sponsored by the provincial government. Dr. Yan Fuqing
became director of the new college and Dr. Hume its dean.107 Yan
had already acquired advanced medical degrees from Yale, the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, and Johns Hopkins and was
rapidly emerging as one of new China’s leading medical research
scientists. While working in Changsha he carried out and published
major studies on the incidence and control of hookworm disease.
He was a leading figure in the establishment of the Chinese Medical
Association and became its first president. He was a pioneer in the
promotion of public health and in the development of colleges of
modern medicine led by Chinese physicians and reflecting Chinese
medical aspirations.108
Hume, for his part, was an enthusiastic Sinophile. He developed
a broad appreciation of Chinese culture and a professional interest in
the practice of Chinese medicine. It was his hope that graduates of
the college “would lead their people across the chasm between empirical [Chinese] and experimental [Western] medicine . . . [to] a new
system of medicine which would provide treatment and preventive
care for all the people of China.”109 What prophetic words! In 1926
Hume resigned as a result of foot-dragging by American trustees over
the transfer of managerial authority to Chinese staff.110 A year later
political and military upheaval forced the suspension of the college. It
reopened in 1929 with forty-four students in two premedical classes.
Two years later the college registered with the Ministry of Education
and became eligible for some national as well as provincial government
aid. It also received aid from the British Boxer Fund.111
The college was now Hunan’s premier medical educational institution. Before the war plans were under way to develop a province-wide
public health program, largely under Xiangya’s direction.112 After the
war broke out the college shifted to providing war service and took
on sixty refugee students. Preparations for evacuation began in June
1938, and as a result of air raids the college was moved to Guiyang in
September. Forty tons of equipment and supplies, including cadavers,
were transported, and eight two-ton buses carried the students, staff,
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and families. The move was completed on October 11, and the college
reopened with 120 students on October 24. Land was leased from a
Hunan guild house, and by March 1939 the college had three twostory structures and several small shacks for classrooms and dormitories. Senior students were lodged at the Central Hospital, which served
as the clinical teaching facility.113
But the college was still not safely out of the war zone. In July 1940
several bombs exploded on the campus, and four nurses were killed in
the Central hospital. The college remained affiliated with hospitals in
Changsha and the provincial wartime capital of Yuanling, which were
used for its interns and largely staffed by its faculty. In January 1942
the college buildings in Changsha were destroyed by fire during the
third battle of Changsha along with all the remaining equipment not
moved in 1938.114
By this time the college had largely weaned itself from its missionary origins and adopted the ideology and practice of State Medicine.
“The Hsiangya Medical College,” said the 1941 report, “aims to serve
China as one of her best medical schools. . . . Its educational policy is
directed towards training good citizens in addition to qualified physicians. It strives to instill into students the rationale of State Medicine
and the spirit of public service.”115 Students were organized under military discipline and educated according to the tutor system advocated by
the CME. Staff and students formed a joint committee to participate
in public education. Every year most seniors went off to rural districts
in the summer to help in anti-epidemic work in collaboration with
the public health authorities.116 Philosophy and practice of this sort
enabled Xiangya to cooperate quite effectively with National Guiyang
Medical College, which was led by comparable guidelines. Dr. Balfour,
visiting in May 1939, found Xiangya governed by an “extraordinary
determination and spirit.”117
The college’s main difficulties at this time were financial. Organizationally it was neither a missionary nor a government institution,
consequently it lacked an assured financial base. The move to Guiyang
had cost ¥20,000 and the erection of temporary buildings another
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¥18,000 (then $3,000 by Balfour’s estimate). The college’s revenue in
1938 and 1939 was optimistically estimated at ¥125,000; its budgeted
expenses were ¥165,000.118 By 1939 the college was facing a financial
crisis, and there were doubts that it could continue. Dr. Yan Fuqing,
at that time director of the NHA, discussed with Grant the possibility
of emergency aid, but according to the latter the semi-official nature of
Xiangya made central support somewhat more difficult.119 But Xiangya was too valuable an enterprise to let go; consequently the following year it was nationalized and provided with a government grant of
¥242,800.120 This was not enough to meet the college’s expenses, but
financial aid from ABMAC, the CMB, the Rockefeller Foundation,
the British Boxer Indemnity Fund, the Yale in China Association, and
local sources helped to cover the deficits.121
Xiangya’s ability to survive was based on a highly charged sense
of mission. Throughout the war it maintained strong emotional and
practical ties with Changsha and Hunan. In March 1944, reported the
director, Dr. Zhang Xiaoqian (H. C. Chang), the college planned to
move its clinical classes back to Changsha “where its primary mission
lies.”122 The Xiangya hospital, though badly damaged, still maintained
150 beds and a large outpatient attendance. The provincial government wanted the college back, and the Hunan people “clamor for our
return.”123 When the Japanese later that year mounted a sweeping military offensive into south and southwest China, the Xiangya hospital in
Yuanling became a military base hospital and sent an operating team
out to help treat wounded soldiers. Unfortunately Changsha fell to the
enemy. All the Xiangya establishments “were laid in ruins,” and the
fate of the staff was unknown. It was, reported Dr. Zhang, a terrible
blow to the college materially and psychologically. “But,” he asserted,
“we are . . . determined to hold on and persevere.”124
In this latter respect, Xiangya was truly successful. Despite the
pressures of accelerating inflation the college held on to its faculty and
in the commercially modest context of Guiyang avoided the conflicts
of moonlighting. Under Dr. Zhang’s stern and unflagging leadership,
teaching and discipline were upheld.125 Probably the college’s biggest
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achievement was its management of students. Nearly all of the Xiangya students were refugees, cut off from family support and dependent
on public aid. To cope with this situation the college developed an
active student life program. Student organizations included a student
self-government association, a student YMCA (in 1941 it had 99
members out of a total enrollment of 120), an active student Christian fellowship group, a glee club, a dramatics club, a volleyball team,
and a student self-help society, which raised relief funds for impoverished students. Students slept in small dormitories holding twelve
to fourteen people and did their own cleaning and most other jobs,
including night watch.126
To stave off the effects of inadequate nutrition, the college health
service vaccinated all students against typhoid, cholera, and smallpox
and students in clinical work against tetanus. As a result of rigorous
health care, the incidence of active pulmonary tuberculosis was kept
down over three years to only 2 percent, even though fluoroscopic
examinations showed that 80 percent of the students had spots on their
lungs.127 Eligibility for financial aid increased through the war years.
In 1941 55 percent of students were receiving aid. By 1942 this had
risen to approximately 75 percent and by 1944 to over 80 percent,
although the vast majority were still reported to be in pitiful plight
financially.128 The curriculum emphasized laboratory work, individual
instruction, and small group conferences. A thesis involving original
work was required for graduation.129
In December 1944 these standards were once again put to the
test when the Japanese drive into southwest China forced Xiangya
to evacuate from Guiyang. The main body of students went off by
foot to Zunyi north of Guiyang city, where with the assistance of
alumni the women were able to continue by truck still farther northward to Chongqing.130 Sixty percent of the college’s equipment was
trucked out and reassembled in space allotted by the Chongqing army
hospital and nearby facilities. This time the expenses of the move
and relocation cost a staggering ¥25 million.131 Teaching resumed in
early March, and the college made up for lost time by shortening the
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summer vacation. Conditions at the Chongqing campus were primitive. Dissecting was done in a large floorless room, which served as
sleeping quarters for women students. Students slept fifty to sixty in
a room and ate outside in a yard or under a mat shed.132 The college
survived this latest ordeal and was even able to put on a four-month
course in premedical and preclinical science for fifty-one unqualified
physicians recruited for service with the Chinese National Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA).133 Soon afterwards it began
preparing to return to Changsha.
The experiences of National Central and Xiangya suggest that leadership of the chief administrators exerted considerable influence on the
evolution of institutional goals and practice. Dr. Qi and Dr. Zhang
had different visions of the purposes of medical education and different
ideas about how to maintain standards, but similar resolve in pursuing
them and in attracting the support of Western agencies. One could sum
up these differences by noting that Dr. Qi was interested in maintaining the research and clinical competence of his faculty and Dr. Zhang
in maintaining the health and capability of his students. Dr. Zhang
also had his sights set on community service. Several other medical
colleges, particularly National Shanghai and National Guiyang, were
marked by the direction of strong, sophisticated physicians who had
had outstanding medical education. Such leaders felt themselves equal
in professional attainment to their Western counterparts and were thus
not uncomfortable about approaching Western agencies and discussing
their needs. Most of the remaining colleges were much less fortunate in
this respect. Consequently they were unable to raise comparable funds
from Western sources and continued to depend heavily on the Ministry of Education and the CME.
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Changes in Central Government
Leadership: From Nationalism
Back to Internationalism
In the early 1940s the CME and the Ministry of Education appear
to have leaned towards an increasingly conservative and nationalistic
outlook. In the late summer of 1943 Dr. Dai Tianyou, a Shanghai
Medical College graduate of 1933 with an MPH from Harvard, was
appointed CME executive secretary. This was regarded by medical
college leaders as a step in the right direction, as Dr. Dai had a public
health background and was a protégé of Dr. Zhu Zhanggeng. But Dr.
Dai was young and in no position to challenge the minister and his
associates. In October the Ministry sent a letter to the missionarycontrolled West China Union University Medical College reminding
it that all medical colleges should plan their teaching program according to the Ministry’s revised curriculum, report clinical histories and
diagnostic data in Chinese, and identify drugs according to the government’s 1932 pharmacopeia.134 In November the Ministry put out
regulations for students wishing to study abroad, requiring them to
pass an examination and attend a course at the Guomindang’s Central
Institute of Party and Political Training. A supervisory bureau was
charged to examine the scholastic record and thought and conduct of
those already studying abroad. In January 1944 Dr. Dai himself was
dispatched for almost six months to a training camp in a Chongqing
suburb.135 These moves were not well received by the foreign medical
establishment and led Dr. Forkner to criticize the CME publicly as a
form of “national control on medical education.”136
When not attending the training camp, Dr. Dai attempted to keep
up with CME business. He reported in April 1944 that there were then
twenty-four medical colleges in the interior, seventeen of college and
seven of vocational school standing. These institutions averaged around
thirty-five teaching staff (mostly junior) and two hundred students and
turned out approximately five hundred graduates a year. Because of
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limited laboratory equipment, little hope existed of increasing enrollments, and because of lack of funds for salaries, the staff members were
“more and more” going out for private practice. Education was losing
ground to inflation and war weariness. By July Dr. Dai noted that
the CME’s goals were largely to consolidate equipment and conserve
teaching personnel in existing colleges.137
At the end of 1944, just eight months before the end of the war,
when the Japanese military onslaught into southwest China was at its
most threatening and the American military presence in that region
building up rapidly, the government went through a major reshuffle in leadership. The minister of education, Chen Lifu, was replaced
by Dr. Zhu Jiahua, a one-time medical student turned engineer and
geologist who had served as president of the Academia Sinica, as vice
president of the executive yuan, and in many other senior government
positions. Dr. Zhu brought in as chair of the CME Dr. Lin Kesheng,
the internationally known British-trained physiologist and vigorous
proponent of State Medicine, who was then serving as deputy director
of the Army Medical Administration. The changes signaled a reversion
to the Ministry’s and the CME’s earlier internationalist orientation. In
March 1945 the CME held a meeting attended by Minister Zhu and
Vice Minister Han Liwu (another internationalist) to develop ideas
for the future of medical education. Six foreign agency representatives,
invited to attend the meeting, pledged assistance.138
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The Challenges of Postwar
Reconstruction
World War II ended unexpectedly when the Japanese surrendered
in August 1945 after the United States obliterated two Japanese cities
with atomic bombs. In Manchuria the Japanese military collapsed, but
in China proper, Japanese troops kept themselves organized and under
military discipline as they prepared to surrender to Chinese forces.
Both the Nationalist and the Communist forces wanted the weapons
and equipment of the Japanese troops.
Within the Nationalist Guomindang government, all government
agencies and various colleges and military organizations prepared to
move back into the areas of China that had been occupied by the
Japanese. The move was in general from southwest China back to
the populous regions of east and north China and particularly from
Chongqing down the Yangtze and back to the old Nationalist capital
of Nanjing. Communist forces in northwest China were also preparing to move east where there were many population centers and where
most of China’s cities were located.
There was no question that China’s medical colleges, most of them
originally from territory the Nationalists were preparing to reclaim,
were desperate to return to their original locations. Surveys of the time
graphically express the difficulties that Nationalist China’s medical
colleges faced. An account by Dr. Zhu Hengbi, written in English
for the information of foreign readers, gives examples of the appalling living and professional conditions. To cite a couple of examples:
The paper of student notebooks was so thin that it tore when the pen
touched it and melted when the ink flowed. Notes were therefore
usually illegible, especially under the dim nocturnal light of tung oil
lamps. In addition, the quality of the tung oil was so bad that the
nostrils of students filled with soot after one to two hours of study.
Perhaps most shocking, even the rats were hungry, gnawing holes in
shoes and clothing and the walls of huts.139
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According to Dr. Leo Eloesser, a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) surgeon who spent fourteen
months working in and visiting medical colleges and teaching and
mission hospitals throughout China, anatomy and physiology teachers were especially scarce because of hopeless poverty and very badly
equipped departments. Other basic science departments were marginally better off because their laboratories were subsidized. Private schools
were tainted with commercialism, “a few of the mission schools being
among the worst offenders.” Some of the smaller colleges were diploma
mills—medical schools in name only.140 Forkner reported to the CMB
a serious shortage of senior staff in biology, biochemistry, obstetrics
and gynecology, otolaryngology, genitourinary surgery, and neuropsychiatry. He concluded that these problems seemed insurmountable.141
Dr. Dai himself confirmed this pessimistic review by stating that twothirds of the departments of existing medical colleges were short of
teaching staff above the level of instructor.142
Further problems arose once the refugee colleges began the task of
returning to their original homes. National Shanghai Medical College,
which had remained more stable than most, lost all its equipment,
supplies, and files when the boat carrying them got into an accident and
caught on fire while in transit down the Yangtze River, which flowed
from the interior of the country toward Shanghai on the coast.143
National Xiangya returned to Changsha in south China to find nothing left of the medical college buildings except charred walls and piles
of broken brick covered by a dense growth of rank weeds and wild
shrubs. The hospital building had been partially destroyed and the
surviving quarters abandoned in haste by the enemy, leaving a scene of
widespread confusion and filth. National Zhongzheng Medical College
returned to Nanchang to find eight of nine buildings totally destroyed.
A visiting professor writing in 1947 reported that nearly all of the
laboratory equipment was destroyed or confiscated, the library gone,
and the faculty struggling to operate under deplorable conditions.144
National Tongji Medical College was obliged to seek temporary quarters as all its buildings had been ruined during the war.145
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National Guiyang Medical College had abandoned its arduously
constructed campus during the evacuation of Guiyang in December
1944. Its normally imperturbable director, Dr. Li Zongen (C. U.
Lee), reported a staggering material loss, especially in the new campus,
where only the outer shells of the buildings were left.146 These losses
had resulted not from enemy action but from an influx of Chinese
troops and refugees under conditions of extreme cold. Troops had set
fire to buildings and chopped up the college’s furniture as a means of
keeping warm, while the college’s new laboratories had been wrecked
by “unidentified mobs.”147
It must have taken considerable willpower to overcome such
appalling setbacks. Money alone could not buy back what had been
lost. In this respect China’s medical colleges were now fundamentally
beyond the influence of foreign financial aid or missionary enterprise.
Stripped of material resources and operating under conditions of acute
inflation, they could only fall back on the bedrock of trained leadership and professional vision, both of which had survived the war to
some extent.148
For example, undeterred by its material wreckage, National Guiyang
Medical College announced that its postwar mission in southwest China
was to promote the development of State Medicine, “which is deemed
to be the best practical system of socializing medical science under the
existing socio-economic conditions of China.” A clear understanding
of the health problems of the nation and a real interest in state medical practice would determine the success of the students in their future
careers. “The entire contents of the teaching program should be along
such basic lines.”149 In Changsha, National Xiangya’s clinical staff got
the hospital reopened by October 1945 and had 130 beds in operation
by the end of the year. Patients were “crowding in” with dysentery,
typhoid, typhus, malaria, and accident injuries. None were turned away
for lack of funds. Reconstruction of the college buildings began in April
1946 as soon as money could be appropriated.150
In Lanzhou a well-administered central hospital and an outstanding nursing school provided the basis for the development of a medical
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college to serve the huge northwest hinterland. The UNRRA medical
leaders Drs. Berislav Borcic and Liu Ruiheng visiting in 1947 found
there an “excellent spirit of cooperation.”151 By contrast Dr. Liu found
National Zhangshan Medical College in Guangzhou to be in poor
condition because of a weak dean, while National Shenyang Medical
College—recently recovered from the Japanese—was in “just a mess of
disorganization,” again because of weak leadership.152
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Conclusion: The Sinicization of
China’s Medical Colleges
In terms of the overall picture, Nationalist China ended 1945
with thirty-five civilian medical colleges containing around 5,300
students and 975 teachers. Another seven medical colleges were in
process of being reclaimed from former Japanese-occupied territory in northeast China.153 At that time several of the colleges were
in a state of near paralysis, short of funds and hoping desperately to
return to their former locations. In a letter to ABMAC’s president,
the noted biochemist Dr. Donald D. Van Slyke, Dr. Liu Ruiheng
reported that the Nationalist government, itself strapped for funds,
could do little more than support a half dozen of the best national
medical colleges. The Ministry of Education was afraid to announce
this.154 And yet rehabilitation of old and establishment of new colleges
during the immediate postwar years brought these totals up by May
1947 to forty-two colleges with upwards of nine thousand students.155
Around forty-eight hundred of these students were enrolled in twenty-one national medical colleges, and another nineteen hundred were
in provincial colleges and vocational schools. The remainder were
distributed among thirteen private and missionary schools, predominantly in the former.
As these figures indicate, the war had served to bring about a decisive shift in Chinese medical education from Western- and missionarydominated institutions to national and provincial establishments led
by Chinese administrators. This shift was not immediately apparent
since agencies such as the CMB and ABMAC continued to play an
active although financially reduced role in the postwar reconstruction
of medical education, as did UNRRA and CNRRA, which had the
specific task of supporting national reconstruction. But once plans got
under way to reopen the PUMC in Beiping, the CMB terminated its
wartime grants to six national and two missionary medical colleges in
order to concentrate its funds on its primary beneficiary.156
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Consequently, except for the CMB’s continuing influence over
the PUMC (reopened in 1947), foreign agencies no longer had any
substantial impact on the direction and evolution of Chinese medical
education, which henceforth lay in Chinese hands. Thus well before
the Communist armies swept the Nationalist forces out of China in
1949, driving Western agencies out along with them, modern biomedical education had already firmly rooted itself in China and was largely
free of dependence on foreign leadership or support.
Another important development lay in the introduction of the
predominantly coastal prewar medical establishment to the health
conditions and needs of China’s vast interior provinces. State Medicine,
which might have seemed a distant goal in the fashionable prewar establishments of Shanghai and Beiping, became a much more immediate
challenge under the conditions of poverty, disease, and primitive health
service experienced in wartime China. Medical students conscripted
to serve in China’s military and public health services could no longer
be unaware of the challenges lying beyond the classrooms and urban
clinics.157 Medical leaders, lacking the resources to promote research
and functioning under conditions of extraordinary deprivation, could
concentrate only on preserving the basics of modern biomedicine for
use in a future of peace and reconstruction. Under conditions so unfavorable to the development of curative facilities, prevention and prophylaxis assumed a relatively more important role in education and practice.
Field experience and clinical practice prevailed over scientific research.
A third development of considerable significance for China’s medical practice was the growing enrollment of women in medical schools.
According to Dr. Zhu Hengbi, the number of women graduates
increased from 20 percent before the war to 40 to 50 percent after it.158
Enrollment figures for medical and pharmacy schools in 1945 suggest
average male to female ratios of a little under three to one; nevertheless, the enrollment of two thousand female students in a traditionally
dominantly male profession is by any standard significant.159 Applications also seem to have shot up. In 1947 National Xiangya Medical
College reported 2,408 applicants for 76 openings.160
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The wartime and postwar eras in China provide a rich environment for the study of the evolution of modern biomedicine and its
impact on national development in a major non–Western civilization. After 1949 and the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China, the issues of development and modern medicine’s contribution to it would be dominated by an assertive political ideology, to
which all sectors of national effort would have to conform.161 Before
1949 this was not the case. Despite the conservative and nationalistic
ideology of the Guomindang’s wartime Ministry of Education, there
is little evidence that it exercised a controlling influence over the
evolution of modern biomedical education. The prevailing reformist
ideology—State Medicine—had little to do with party politics. It
was conceived by professional administrators and educators as the
only system able to adapt modern biomedicine to the conditions of
public health in China and to make it a force in the development of
the country. To what extent that happened cannot be determined
without access to grassroots data beyond the reach of this research.
But at least it can be concluded that various wartime medical educators kept the idea of State Medicine alive and active on the national
educational agenda.
This does not mean that the American-inspired research and teaching model, epitomized by the PUMC, did not continue to stand at the
forefront of modern biomedical education in China. The rapid postwar return of the refugee medical colleges to their original campuses
signaled not merely a nostalgia for familiar cultural and urban habitats but a professional yearning for urban, laboratory-based scientific
research and teaching, which the war had disrupted. An intense thirst
developed for study at foreign medical centers, and foreign medical
professors were eagerly welcomed to China.162 In the search for scientific renewal both Drs. Li Zongen and Zhang Xiaoqian, who were
among the most determined wartime advocates of State Medicine, left
their directorships of the Guiyang and Xiangya colleges and returned
to the PUMC when circumstances made this possible, with Dr. Li as
the PUMC’s new director.
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But Dr. Li came into that position with reservations about PUMC’s
reliance on English language instruction and American cultural orientation. The graduates, in his view, had significantly strengthened
China’s health services technically but less so socially and intellectually. The problem was that the college still somehow suggested “a mere
transplantation into China’s soil of a first-class medical college from
America.”163 Given the college’s reliance on American funding and
leadership, this perception of foreignness was inevitable and, in fact,
would take years to work through.
Thus the war left unresolved the question of the integration of
the clinic- and laboratory-based experimental model of biomedical education with the public health–based State Medicine model.
Wartime experience had established the case for State Medicine but
not established rewards sufficient to root it permanently in the medical curriculum of Nationalist China.164 Biomedical education at war’s
end remained conflicted between the scientific and material satisfactions of curative treatment and the primarily social satisfactions of
improving the preponderantly rural public health services. As Dr.
Chen Zhiqian had warned, it would require extraordinary statesmanship to resolve this problem.165
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This account is based primarily on materials in the archives of the
Rockefeller Foundation, the China Medical Board, and the American
Bureau for Medical Aid to (now Advancement in) China. It is supplemented by Chinese and American secondary sources, by an interview, and by journal articles and other sources found in the library of
the New York Academy of Medicine. The work of medical training
programs developed in areas covered by the Red Armies is the subject
of a separate study.
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Photos & Captions

Dr. Liu at ABMAC office in New York, with
Dr. B. A. Garside, at that time Vice President of
United China Relief, and Ms. Helen Kennedy
Stevens, Executive Director of ÅBMAC.

Dr. J. Heng Liu, Director of the
National Health Administration in the
1930s and former Director of the Peking
Union Medical College. Dr. Liu was a
graduate of Harvard College and the
Harvard Medical School.

Students of National Xiangya Medical College.

Dr. Frank Co Tui, co-founder and
wartime Vice President of ABMAC,
and a professor at New York University
Medical School.

Mme. Chiang Kai-shek with war orphans. Mme
Chiang took a close interest in military and
civilian relief and served as health policy advisor
to her husband.
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Wartime health policy task force meeting in Chungking.
Front row, from left: Drs. Sa Bentong, Lin Kesheng,
Han Liwu, Jin Baoshan (Director, National Health
Administration), Liu Ruiheng. Dr. Berislav Borcic,
League of Nations medical consultant, standing rear left.

Drs. Lin Kesheng and Donald D.
Van Slyke. Dr. Lin, Professor of
Physiology at the Peking Union
Medical College, was Director
until August 1942 of the Chinese
Red Cross Medical Relief Corps.
Dr. Van Slyke, President of the
American Bureau for Medical
Aid to China (ABMAC), was the
leading American biochemist of
his day.

NDMC evacuating to Taiwan.

Dr. Zhang Xiaoqian. Wartime President of
National Xiangya Medical College, he was
noted for his strong interest in student health
and his dedication to the college’s mission of
service to the people of Hunan.
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Dr. Yan Fuqing, former President of National
Xiangya Medical College and a Director of
the National Health Administration. With
a PhD in public health from Yale, Dr. Yan
became a public health pioneer in China
and carried out significant research on
hookworm infestation among miners.

Photos & Captions

Burma Road convoy, c. 1940. Construction of the Burma
Road was one of the most arduous public works projects
carried out by the Nationalist government during the Dr. George Armstrong, US Army
Surgeon General, China theater; later
wartime era.
US Army Surgeon General, Vice
President of New York University,
and President of ABMAC. He
worked closely with Dr. Lin Kesheng
during 1944-45.

Yang Wen-tah in a Nationalist uniform talks with
Dr. J. Heng Liu.

Kunming supplies. Kunming was the main supply
depot at the end of the trans-Burma airlift.

Chen Lifu, wartime Minister of
Education. Mr. Chen was a vigorous
advocate of Chinese medicine and
more than once lectured visiting
Americans on its benefits.
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Delousing station. The
Chinese Red Cross
Medical Relief Corps
started a delousing,
bathing, and scabies
program in September
1938, setting up seven
stations at army medical
hospitals. These vats
were mostly improvised
from whatever materials
were available.

Dr. O. K. Khaw (Xu Yujie), with
Dr. Richard N. Pierson. Born in
Malaya and at one time Professor
of Public Health and Parasitology
at the Peking Union Medical
College, Dr. Khaw later joined the
faculty of the National Defense.
Medical Center. He survived ten
days alone and barefooted in the
Burmese jungle.

Ms. Chow Meiyu, Graduate of
the PUMC School
of Nursing and
founder of Army
Nursing School in
Guiyang, 1943.

Dr. Zhu Hengbi, pioneering pharmacologist
and wartime President of National Shanghai
Medical College.
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Glossary

English

Pinyin

Chinese
Characters

Paoting

Baoding

保定

Peking

Beijing

北京

Peking Union Medical College

Beijing Xiehe yixueyuan

北京協和醫學院

Peiping

Beiping

北平

Beiyang Government

Beiyang zhengfu

北洋政府

Cai Qiao

蔡翹

Changsha

長沙

Chen Guofu

陳果夫

Changsha

Chen Lifu

陳立夫

C. C. Chen

Chen Zhiqian

陳志潜

Chengtu

Chengdu

成都

Chiang Kai-shek

Jiang Jieshi

蔣介石

Chungking

Chongqing

重慶

Chungchi College

Chongji xueyuan

崇基學院

Chow Mei-yu

Zhou Meiyu

周美玉

T. Y. Tai

Dai Tianyou

戴天右

Ting-hsien

Dingxian

定縣

Du Gongzhen

杜公振

Fu Lianzhang

傅連暲

Fu Weikang

傅維康

Fukien

Fujian

福建

Kansu

Gansu

甘肅

Kanchow

Ganzhou

贛州

Kaochiao

Gaoqiao

高橋

Public Health Personnel
Training Institute

Gonggong weisheng renyuan
xunliansuo

公共衛生人員訓
練所

State Medicine

Gongyi zhidu

公醫制度

Nelson Fu

Kuangtung

Guangdong

廣東

Canton

Guangzhou

廣州

Kueiyang

Guiyang

貴陽

Kueichow

Guizhou

貴州

League of Nations

Guoji lianmeng

國際聯盟

National Shanghai Medical
College

Guoli Shanghai yixueyuan

國立上海醫學院

Guoli Shenyang yixueyuan*
Manchurian Medical College
* postwar name in Nationalist China

國立瀋陽醫學院

99

Public Medicine in Wartime China: The Rosenberg Institute for East Asian Studies:

English

Pinyin

Chinese
Characters

National Tongji University
Medical College

Guoli Tongji daxue yixueyuan

國立同濟大學醫
學院

National College of Pharmacy

Guoli Yaoxue zhuanke xuexiao

國立藥學專科學校

National Central University
Medical College

Guoli Zhongyang daxue
yixueyuan

國立中央大學醫
學院

National Central Nursing
School

Guoli Zhongyang hushi xuexiao

國立中央護士學校

National Xiangya Medical
College

Guoli Xiangya yixueyuan

国立湘雅医学院

National Zhongshan University Guoli Zhongshan daxue

國立中山大學

National Zhongzheng Medical
College

Guoli Zhongzheng yixueyuan

國立中正醫學院

Nationalist Party

Guomindang

國民黨

Han Liwu

Hang Liwu

杭立武

Hangchow

Hangzhou

杭州

Hankow

Hankou

漢口

He Long

賀龍

Hopei

Hebei

河北

Hu Dingan

胡定安

Huang Jiasi

黃家駟

West China Union University
Medical College

Huaxi xiehe daxue yixueyuan

華西協和大學醫
學院

Hunan

Hunan

湖南

Kiangsu

Jiangsu

江蘇

Jiangsu Special Medical
College

Jiangsu zhuanke yixueyuan

江蘇專科醫學院

Kiangsi

Jiangxi

江西

Education for national
salvation

Jiaoyu jiuguo

教育救國

Ministry of Education

Jiaoyubu

教育部

P. Z. King

Jin Baoshan

金寶善

Tsinan

Jinan

濟南

Jinhua

金華

Army Medical Administration

Junshi weiyuanhui junyishu

軍事委員會軍醫署

Kunming

Kunming

昆明

Lanchow

Lanzhou

蘭州
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English

Pinyin

Chinese
Characters

Li Tingan

李廷安

C. U. Lee

Li Zongen

李宗恩

Robert K. S. Lim

Lin Kesheng

林可勝

J. Heng Liu

Liu Ruiheng

劉瑞恒

Luo Jialun

羅家倫

Mao Tse-tung

Mao Zedong

毛澤東

South Manchuria Railway

Nan Manzhou Tiedao

南滿洲鐵道

Nanchang

Nanchang

南昌

Nanking

Nanjing

南京

Ministry of the Interior

Neiwubu

內務部

Nie Rongzhen

聶榮臻

Peng Pai

彭湃

S. N. Cheer

Qi Shounan

戚壽南

Cheloo Medical College

Qilu Yixueyuan

齊魯醫學院

Ruan Shangcheng

阮尚丞

Shanghai

Shanghai

上海

Shantung

Shandong

山東

St. John’s University Medical
College

Sheng Yeuhan daxue yixueyuan

聖約翰大学醫學院

Shenyang

Shenyang

瀋陽

Szechuan

Sichuan

四川

Song Wusheng

宋悟生

Suzhou

蘇州

Taihe

泰和

Tengchong

腾冲

Tianjin

天津

Tuyun’guan

圖雲關

Wang Jingwei

汪精衛

Wang Yuanchen

汪元臣

Suchow

Tientsin

Y. C. Wang
Ministry of Health

Weishengbu

衛生部

National Health
Administration

Weishengshu

衛生署

Wong Wen-hao

Weng Wenhao

翁文灝

Wuhan

Wuhan

武漢
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English

Pinyin

Chinese
Characters

Xiangya

湘雅

Y. T. Hsiao

Xiao Yuanding

肖元定

Xinhai Revolution

Xinhai Geming

辛亥革命

F. C. Yen

Yan Fuqing

顔福慶

O.K. Khaw

Xu Yujie

许雨阶

Marian Yang

Yang Chongrui

楊崇瑞

Yangtze

Yangzijiang

揚子江

Yang Cuihua

楊翠華

Yang Wenda

揚文達

Yibin

宜賓

Yixue jiaoyu weiyuanhui

醫學教育委員會

Commission on Medical
Education

Yunan

Yongxin

永新

Yu Yan

俞炎

Yuanling

沅陵

Yunnan

雲南

Zhang Jian

張建

H. C. Chang

Zhang Xiaoqian

張孝騫

Chekiang

Zhejiang

浙江

Zhenning

鎮寧

Chinese Medicine

Zhong Yi

中醫

Chinese Red Cross Medical
Relief Corps

Zhongguo Hongshizihui jiuhui
zongduibu

中國紅十字會救護
總隊部

Chinese Medical Association

Zhonghua Yixuehui

中華醫學會

National Medical Association
of China

Zhonghua Yixuehui

中華醫學會

National Central Midwifery
School

Zhongyang Zhuchan xuexiao

中央助産學校

Y. T. Tsur

Zhou Yichun

周詒春

Zhu Chao

朱潮

Chu Teh

Zhu De

朱德

H. P. Chu

Zhu Hengbi

朱恒璧

Zhu Jiahua

朱家驊

C. K. Chu

Zhu Zhanggeng

朱章賡

Tsunyi

Zunyi

遵義
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